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The current patent system is argued to be in a state of crisis. Although
much recent criticism about the patent system has been leveled at so-
called "patent trolls, " another trend has emerged that may prove more
enduring and potentially more troublesome. Patent holders have devel-
oped more systematized and strategic methods to obtain revenues from
the patent system, building business plans around leveraging monetary
value from what are called "liquid patents " herein. Recognizing that the
patent right can be monetized into licensing fees and damages in an ac-
tion for patent infringement, some entities have undertaken formalized
programs to gather or acquire critical patents in particular fields. These
practices are supported by patent rules of law, but are in contravention
of the larger goals of the patent system. This work traces certain attrib-
utes that encourage liquid patent holders' strategies. Further, the paper
proposes that the remedies provisions of the patent system should be
modified to ensure that this practice does not harm innovation. In addi-
tion, the traditional antitrust protections for patent holders should be
eliminated to prevent abuse and curb liquid patent holders' ability to




I. LIQUID PATENTS AND THEIR OWNERS ........................................... 203
A. Creating the Liquid Patent Right ............................................... 204
B. Liquid Patent Holders' Strategic Assertion of Patents .............. 205
C. Liquid Patent Markets and Holders ........................................... 207
D . An Incentive to Liquidize ............................................................ 211
II. PATENT POLICIES THAT FOSTER THE PERSISTENCE OF LIQUID
PA TEN TS ......................................................................................... 2 15
A. The Patent as Monolith: A Uniform System of Rights .............. 215
B. Patent Enforcem ent .................................................................... 217
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. BFA,
Rochester Institute of Technology; J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The
author would like to thank her research assistants Veronica Ham and Hannah Quick, and Professor
Rachel Salcido, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law for her editing assistance. All
errors that remain are my responsibility,
200 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1
C . The U tility Standard .................................................................. 219
D. Uniform Construction of the Patent Right ................................. 220
E. The H eadless Patentee ............................................................... 222
III. WHETHER LIQUID PATENTS SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY:
THE DEBATE OVER INDIVIDUALIZED VERSUS UNIFORM PATENT
R IG H T S ............................................................................................ 224
IV. FOUNDATIONAL PUBLIC POLICIES SERVED BY THE PATENT
S Y STEM ........................................................................................... 227
A. The Constitutional Basis of the Patent Reward as Incentive ..... 227
B. Analysis of Liquid Patent and Patent Incentives ........................ 230
C. Ex Ante Justifications for the Patent System: Kitch 's Prospect
T h eo ry ........................................................................................ 2 3 5
D. Summary of Liquid Patents and the Relation to Patent Theory. 238
V. A PROPOSAL: USING PATENT REMEDIES AS A SOLUTION ............. 239
A . Injunctive R elief ........................................................................ 239
B . M onetary Rem edies .................................................................... 242
VI. LIQUID IP: PATENTS AND MONOPOLIES ........................................ 257
A. Antitrust Protection for Exploitation of the Patent Right .......... 258
B. Antitrust Limitations on Anticompetitive Patentee Conduct ...... 260
C. Liquid Patent Holders and Antitrust Law .................................. 264
C ON CLU SION ......................................................................................... 266
INTRODUCTION
When patent systems first developed, rewarding the inventor as a
creative force was a paramount and express purpose.1 Now some five
centuries later, the state of the patent system has undergone momentous
change. Serious questions have been raised about how well the patent
system is serving invention and society. Critics have deemed the patent
system in the U.S. at a crisis point.
2 Legislators have called for reform.
3
1. The first known patent statute was enacted in 1474 in the Venetian Republic, and has been
translated to read:
We have among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover ingenious devices...
if provision were made for the works and devices discovered by such persons, so that
others who may see them could not build them and take the inventor's honor away, more
men would then apply their genius, would discover, and would build devices of great util-
ity and benefit to our Commonwealth.
Venetian Republic Patent Statute (1474), reprinted in PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 10-11 (Donald S.
Chisum et al. eds., 2d ed. 2001).
2. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 170
(2004) (commenting that the patent system is a "freight train out of control"); Patently Ridiculous,
N.Y. TIMES, March 22, 2006, at A24.
3. Press Release, Representative Lamar Smith, Smith Introduces Reform Bill (June 8, 2005),
available at http://Iamarsmith.house.gov/news.asp?FormMode=Detail&ID=648; see also H.R. 2795,
109th Cong. (2005) (tracking the introduction of the Patent Reform Act).
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Some condemnation of the current patent system has been leveled at
"patent trolls," a term coined 4 to describe patent holders who do not
commercialize an invention, but rather raise money by asserting the pat-
ent against those who do.5 Patent trolling has ignited a highly polarized
policy debate. On one hand, patent trolls are characterized as "profi-
teers" that demonstrate that something has "gone very wrong" with the
U.S. patent system, having turned the purpose of the patent right "on its
head, using [patents] to tax, blackmail, and even shut down productive
companies unless they pay high enough ransoms.",6 On the other hand,
this activity has been argued to constitute "simply enforcing the right of
exclusion granted to them by the Constitution, and ... help[ing] to en-
sure that the system is functioning properly and as intended."' Indeed,
one prominent lawyer who specializes in asserting patents has been de-
scribed as "a guardian angel" for solo inventors who would otherwise be
unable to enforce their patents. 8 At the same time, it is difficult to avoid
the evidence that the system is being used to create considerable private
wealth. 9 Although the term has been characterized as too vague,' 0 overly
broad, 1 and "used unfairly to deride" patentees, 2 the phrase patent troll
is always used in the pejorative and contrary to how a healthy patent
system should operate.
Patent trolls have become the fulcrum for public debate about the
underlying incentive structure of the patent laws. The necessity for pat-
ent reform depends, to some degree, on whether patent trolls are a per-
manent fixture in the patent landscape. At the same time, another trend
has emerged that may prove more enduring. Although patent trolling
raises some troubling issues, some patent holders have developed even
more systematized and strategic methods to obtain revenues from the
patent system, building business plans around leveraging value from
asserting patents. This activity-which for purposes of this article is
4. The term "patent troll" was reportedly coined in 2001 by Peter Detkin, a patent attorney,
while working as counsel for Intel Corp. See Rob Garretson, Has the Enemy of the Patent Trolls
Become One?, CIO INSIGHT, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.cioinsight.com/article2/0,1540,1902291,00.
asp.
5. Testimony of Peter Detkin, TRANSCRIPT OF THE FTC/DOJ HEARINGS ON THE
IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 112 (Feb. 2, 2002),
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/worddocs/competition.doc.
6. Patently Ridiculous, supra note 2.
7. John LaPlante, The Case for Abandoning the Term "Patent Troll, " INTELL. PROP. LITIG.,
Winter 2006, available at http://www.rkmc.com/TheCase forAbandoningtheTermPatent_
Troll.htm.
8. Lisa Lerer, Meet the Original Patent Troll, IP L. & BUS., July 20, 2006, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 153299926232.
9. Id.
10. What the Heck Is a Patent Troll?, PHOSITA: AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW BLOG,
Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.okpatents.com/phosita/archives/2006/04/what-the-heck-i.html.
11. See Dennis Crouch, What is a Patent Troll?, PATENTLY-O, May 12, 2006,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/05/what-is a_paten.html#comments (excluding from the
definition of "patent troll" those entities who do research and development).
12. LaPlante, supra note 7.
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termed "liquidizing patents"- treats patents as a commodity. As ex-
plored further in this article, using patents as liquid assets invokes prob-
ing questions about patent policy and the manner in which the system is
administered.
Recognizing that the patent right can be monetized into licensing
fees and damages in an action for patent infringement, some entities have
undertaken formalized programs to gather or acquire critical patents in
particular fields.' 3 Firms have made patents the financial centerpiece of
their businesses, by developing patentable ideas internally or through
purchase.'4 Other entities have become market makers, undertaking pro-
grams such as patent auctions to facilitate patent transfers. 5 Some uses
of patents as assets have become financially creative, for example one
entity uses patents as collateral, having established a multi-million dollar
fund to provide loans that are secured by the debtor's intellectual prop-
erty.
16
The framers of the U.S. Constitution authorized the patent system
with the purpose of promoting invention. " Specifically, the patent sys-
tem was developed to provide inventors a reward of the right of exclusiv-
ity for a limited period of time.' 8 The patent laws provide this advantage
to inventors for the ultimate benefit of the public. 19 Under current law,
the patent right can be transferred from the original owner of the idea-
the patent's inventor-in a written contract to an assignee who becomes
the patentee and thereby succeeds to all of the rights originally held by
the inventor. 20 The patentee can license infringers or seek court interven-
tion to prevent others from practicing the invention and seek monetary
relief.
The U.S. patent system treats the patent right as immutable. Objec-
tivity, uniformity and certainty are driving forces in the development and
application of patent law. Under these policies, the patent has taken on a
monolithic quality that, once the right is set in the patent document, be-
comes unchangeable as an engraving in stone unaffected by changes in
ownership. Thus, unlike other legal rights for which the plaintiffs indi-
vidual circumstances are legally relevant to the existence of the plain-
tiff's right to recover, a liquid patent holder can purchase, sell, license
13. See infra text accompanying notes 69-72.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 47-67.
16. OCEAN ToMo, OCEAN TOMO INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL EQUITY (print on file with author).
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
18. Id.
19. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining that in order to obtain a
patent, the invention must have substantial utility, meaning it must provide some benefit to the
public).
20. 35 U.S.C.A § 261 (West 2006).
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and assert the patent without concern that the scope of the right is
changed or diminished by any of this activity. Those who commoditize
patents obtain all of the benefits of the laws that were created for the
protection of inventors.
Perhaps inadvertently, the patent laws have created incentives for
the transfer and financial exploitation of patents that are disconnected
with the development of inventions for public benefit. The profit-
seeking activities of liquid patent holders seem intuitively at odds with
the pubic interest sought to be served by the patent system. Further, liq-
uid patents pose the potential to harm inventive activity in the long term
by amassing control of patents that extracts above-market licensing fees
or that entirely prevents others from performing research or making im-
provements on existing technology.
Part I of this article examines how a liquid patent holder uses estab-
lished patent laws to create the liquid patent right. This section further
explores various examples of how liquid patent holders use patents to
create or amass markets from the patent system. Part II considers how
the patent system has created opportunities for patent holders to shift
their use of patents as means to protect commercial markets to liquid
assets. Part III examines whether the patent system should be modified
to accommodate liquid patents, in light of the system's goals to promote
uniformity. Part IV explores whether the use of liquid patents fits with
the existing justifications for the patent system, and finds that such uses
are either dissonant or contrary to these policies. After considering the
importance of uniformity to the patent system, Part V explores modifica-
tions to the remedies provisions of the Patent Act to resolve concerns
created by the use of liquid patents. Part VI considers a modification to
the protections that patentees have historically enjoyed against antitrust
theories as a further means to prevent liquid patent holders from acting in
a manner that forecloses consumer choice. The final section concludes
that the activities of liquid patent holders are likely to continue, and that
those who administer patent law must remain sensitive to this activity so
that the overall goal of fostering invention is advanced.
I. LIQUID PATENTS AND THEIR OWNERS
The creation of a market for liquid patents depends on the patent
system's ability to create and allow the enforcement of rights that are
severable from the patent's initial inventor. An exploration of the pre-
sent patent system reveals that the statutes not only facilitate liquid pat-
ent rights, but in some instances create incentives to do so. Although the
creation of separate markets for patents may not be based on conscious
or deliberate decisions by lawmakers, nonetheless a number of entities
are using the patent system as a means to transfer and exploit patents as
commodities. The following section explores the creation of liquid pat-
ent rights under the present patent laws. This section also provides some
20061
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examples of several entities engaged in different facets of the creation of
separate markets for patent rights.
A. Creating the Liquid Patent Right
Perhaps the simplest explanation for why liquid patents are growing
in popularity is that this activity "is not only profitable but also perfectly
legal.",2' A liquid patent right is created through a straightforward appli-
cation of the current patent laws. These laws consider the patent right a
bundle of rights similar to a personal property interest that can be con-
veyed, subdivided and exploited for its owner's benefit.
22
As background, an application for a patent must be made by or on
behalf of the actual inventor.23 A party can license and bring an action
for patent infringement if that party is the "patentee," defined by statute
as one who owns the patent or is an exclusive licensee. 24 U.S. patents
can be granted for ideas that have not yet been refined to the point of a
commercially viable product. Thus, an inventor who wishes to patent
an idea before development into a marketable product can do so.
Although the inventor is the presumptive owner of a patent,26 own-
ership can be assigned to another.27 Patents and patent applications can
be readily purchased through individual negotiation, auction or any other
means devised to transfer the right in writing. 8 Except for the writing,
no legal relation between the transferor and the transferee need exist for a
valid assignment. Once ownership is transferred, the patent owner be-
29comes the patentee and can assert the patent against infringers in court.
Patentees can also license, sublicense, further assign and otherwise fully
exploit the patent right to the full extent permitted by the laws.30
Liquid patent holders use the rules authorizing patent transfers to
obtain rights directly from individual inventors, corporations who wish to
raise revenue, or other sources. 1 Such individuals or entities may lack
21. Marcus Reitzig et al., On Sharks, Trolls, and Other Patent Animals- "Being Infringed"
as a Nornatively Induced Innovation Exploitation Strategy, at 3 (Feb. 2006), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-885914 (select "Social Science Research Network, New York, USA" icon
under SSRN Electronic Paper Collection).
22. Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
23. 35 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West 2006); Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 672 (1888).
24. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 100(d), 261, 281; see also Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255
(1891); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1249-50 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
25. In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Usefulness in patent law ... necessar-
ily includes the expectation of further research and development.").
26. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
27. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2006).
28. Id. ("Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by
an instrument in writing.").
29. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG, 944 F.2d at 873-74.
30. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. United States, 591 F.2d 652, 659 (Ct. Cl. 1979).




the resources or desire to engage in the risk and expense of exploiting
patents themselves. As an exploited patent raises no money on its own,
the inventor or original owner has an incentive to transfer the patent in
exchange for either a lump sum or share in royalties earned by the pur-
chasing liquid patent holder.
B. Liquid Patent Holders' Strategic Assertion of Patents
After acquiring the patent right, the liquid patentee selects and in-
vestigates a potential infringer and may decide to commence licensing
negotiations. 32 One common strategy is to find patentees who have inte-
grated the patented invention into a commercial product.33 Both the liq-
uid patent holder and the potential infringer are aware that a failed nego-
tiation can lead to litigation, with the possibility for both monetary dam-
ages and injunctive relief.34 Such negotiations raise the concern ex-
pressed by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion of eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L. C. ,35 that in such circumstances "the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations," par-
ticularly when the patent at issue covers only one aspect of a complex
product.36
Some liquid patent holders employ a number of strategies to maxi-
mize their leverage, and consequently their profit. For example, some
liquid patent holders own patents through holding companies that do not
produce any products. Such entities cannot be countersued for patent
infringement and thus the alleged infringer is in a poor position to exer-
cise any counter-leverage in the licensing negotiation. This considera-
tion does not bar enforcement of the patent right, as the existence of the
patent right is unaffected for patentees who decide not to commercialize
their invention.37 Indeed, one entity creates a shell corporation for each
32. License to Gamble: In-House IP Experts Offer Advice On Making Money From Licensing,
CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, March 2005, at 56 (roundtable interview with individuals from IBM,
Qualcomm, Burnham Institute, Sun World, and TARGUSinfo concerning licensing strategies).
33. Business Perspectives on Patents: Hardware and Semiconductors: FTC/DOJ HEARINGS
TO HIGHLIGHT BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY POLICY, Feb. 28, 2002 (statement of Robert Barr, Vice President, Worldwide Patent
Counsel, Cisco Systems, Inc.) ("They try to patent things that other people or companies will unin-
tentionally infringe and then they wait for those companies to successfully bring products to the
marketplace. They place mines in the minefield."), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/ipsecond.htm
(scroll down to February 28, select "Robert Barr" hyperlink); see generally Reitzig, supra note 21
(discussing the problem with patent trolls by use of a microeconomic model).
34. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 283, 284 (West 2006).
35. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
36. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see Jeremiah Chan & Matthew
Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 9 (2005) ("An injunction can be
a death sentence for a company, especially an emerging technology firm without a diversified prod-
uct portfolio. Patent trolls often target such companies for quick cash because the targets cannot
afford to risk an injunction.").
37. Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1908).
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technology subject matter in which it acquires patents,38 which in many
cases would even further insulate a parent corporation against any liabil-
ity incurred by the shell for any conduct associated with patent assertion
activities in each individual field.
A liquid patent holder who acquires a large number of patents in the
same field as the alleged infringer is well positioned to demand payment,
as the possibility of litigating the validity or infringement of a large
number of claims becomes an expensive impracticability. 39 In a sense,
these multiple patents covering a single product create a "patent thicket"
by a single patent owner.40 This is because patent litigation is sometimes
too costly for small companies or those with marginal profit margins to
sustain.41 Such companies may be forced to settle with liquid patent
owners rather than to litigate infringement and validity of all of the as-
serted patent claims.
Those asserting patents may keep their patent ownership quiet, and
then assert the patent against inadvertent infringers who are already en-
gaged in manufacturing and selling product based on an infringing de-
sign.42  This strategy is based on the view that an infringer who discov-
ers a patent before a product is manufactured will simply redesign
around the patent. 43 By contrast, an infringer is more likely to pay for a
license after locking into an existing design and being faced with the
potential for a large litigation damage award.44
If a patent that covers a key aspect of a feature for which no substi-
tutes are available, the patentee may threaten to shut down a manufac-
turer, leading to a "hold up" problem that throws the infringer's business
38. Michael Kanellos, Microsoft Alums Amass Thousands of Patents, CINET NEWS.COM, Nov.
3, 2005, http://news.com.com/Microsoft+alums+amass+thousands+of+patents/2100-1014_3-
5929360.html.
39. The litigation costs for a case involving a single patent with approximately $1-25 million
at issue costs over $1 million. American Intellectual Property Lawyers Ass'n, 2005 REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY 1-109 (2005); see also Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES.COM, June 24,
2002 (describing IBM's negotiation strategy in response to invalidity and non-infringement argu-
ments made in licensing negotiations asserting seven patents, in which IBM asserted, "... we have
100,000 patents. Do you really want us to go back to Armonk [IBM headquarters in New York] and
find seven patents you do infringe? Or do you just want to make this easy and just pay us $20 mil-
lion?").
40. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, at 1-2 (Mar. 2001), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-273550 (select "Social
Science Research Network, New York, USA" icon under SSRN Electronic Paper Collection) (de-
scribing a "patent thicket" as "a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company
must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.").
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. See also Vincent J. Napoleon, Patents Take
Center Stage in Business Litigation and the Global Business Environment, INSIDECOUNSEL, July
2006 ("Some have referred to patent litigation as 'the sport among kings' because of its expense and
complexity.").
42. See Reitzig et al., supra note 21, at 5.
43. Id. at 17-18.




into doubt.4 5 As others have noted, this problem may be most acute in
the biotechnology area where the proliferation and goals of various in-
terests prevent vital downstream research.46
In combination, such strategies have the potential to allow liquid
patent holders to obtain more licensing revenue than the value of the
patent, even if the patent is invalid. This imposes a monetary burden that
acts as tax on those commercializing or seeking to improve on the sub-
ject matter of the liquid patent. Moreover, hold ups prevent subsequent
invention entirely, perhaps for years as a case is litigated. Such tech-
niques pose a threat to the larger goals of encouraging advancement in
developing knowledge, creating follow-on inventions and commercializ-
ing the benefits of this knowledge for use by the public.
C. Liquid Patent Markets and Holders
A number of business models have developed to facilitate liquid
patents. These include brokerage services that work with either buyers
or sellers and provide assistance for valuation and negotiation and offer-
ing strategic advice. 47 Governmental, educational and some commercial
entities have set up formal technology transfer offices that facilitate li-
cense or transfer of intellectual property rights generated by the offering
48institution. A number of companies who commercialize products open
separate departments to license or assert patents in order to raise licens-
ing revenue.49 Other entities that are engaged in activities that use pat-
ents as financial or strategic assets may assert patents for licensing fees
or attempt to create markets for patent transfers. These are more fully
described in the following subsections.
1. Patent Auctions
A reference to "patent auctions" has a ripped-from-the-headlines
quality that is associated with catchphrases like "[t]he new IP market-
45. Id. at 19.
46. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-
commons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698, 699-700 (arguing that the prolif-
eration of patents in biotechnological research can set up a "tollbooth on the road to product devel-
opment" that may hamper research, noting "[w]hen owners have conflicting goals and each can
deploy its rights to block the strategies of the others, they may not be able to reach an agreement that
leaves enough private value for downstream developers to bring products to the market.").
47. Examples of patent brokers include IPotential, http://www.ipotential.org/overview/
index.htm, and Thinkfire, http://www.thinkfire.com.
48. An organization which lists a number of these offices is The Association of University
Technology Managers, http://www.autm.net/memberConnect/index.cftn. This organization prints an
annual report that features various success stories that demonstrate transfers from idea to commercial
use. See, e.g., THE ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS, TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER STORIES: 25 INNOVATIONS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (2006), available at
http://www.betterworldproject.net/documents/AUTM-BWR.pdf.
49. For example, companies such as IBM both create patentable inventions and offer certain
patents for licensing. See IBM, http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).
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place, 50 "here to stay,"51 and drawing in a "carnival buzz., 52 A number
of auction formats exist, such as the Sotheby's-style auctions held at four
star locations, 53 bankruptcy proceedings designed to raise funds to pay
off creditors,54 do-it-yourself auctions on eBay.com and a free patent
auction website. 55
The name most widely associated with patent auctions is Ocean
Tomo, a self-described "integrated intellectual capital merchant banc"
that plans to conduct two patent auctions per year for the next three
56years. Introduced in April 2006, Ocean Tomo's first patent auction
attracted over 400 professionals, including 30 press attendees, and re-
sulted in the transfer of over $8 million in patent rights.57
Ocean Tomo precedes each auction with a structured process that
requires sellers to pre-qualify their patents according to Ocean Tomo's
own quality and valuation system, which measures the patent's potential
auction value.58 Sellers must also provide information about the patent's
ownership, validity, licensing activity and any known or suspected in-
fringers. 59 A due diligence meeting between the seller and potential bid-
ders takes place. 60 The auction is conducted live, and a contract for the
sale of the patent is formed by the highest bid made above the seller's
reserve and before the fall of the auctioneer's hammer.
61
50. See GREENBERG TAURIG, THE NEW IP MARKETPLACE: PATENT AUCTIONS (2006),
http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2006/0403.pdf.
51. Id. at 4; see also Barry Evans & Gregory Dolin, Why Patent Auctions Are Here to Stay,
THE DAILY DEAL, Apr. 18, 2006.
52. First Patent Auction Draws Buzz, REDHERRING.COM, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www,
redherring.com/article.aspx?a= 16433#.
53. For example, on April 6, 2006, Ocean Tomo held an auction at the San Francisco Ritz
Carlton Hotel, which charged $1,500 fee to bidders preceded by a Gala Dinner. OCEAN TOMo, THE
OCEAN TOMO SPRING 2006 PATENT AUCTION, April 5-6, 2006, at 5, (print on file with author)
[hereinafter OCEAN TOMO, SPRING 2006 PATENT AUCTION]. Ocean Tomo will hold another auction
in Fall 2006 at a Ritz Carlton in New York City. See Ocean Tomo,
http://www.oceantomo.com/auctions.html.
54. John Markoff, Auction of Internet Commerce Patents Draw Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 2004, at C4.
55. See, e.g., Item No. 230006349370, eBay.com (U.S. Patent No. 6,286,439, filed Apr. 20,
1999, asking price $150,000); Item No. 130002119843, eBay.com (asking price $28,000,000); Item
No. 170006433907, eBay.com (U.S. Patent No. 6,570,340, filed July 10, 2000, asking price
$20,999,999 plus 10% royalties); see also Free Patent Auction, http://www.freepatentauction.com/.
56. See Ocean Tomo, http://www.oceantomo.com/; First Patent Auction Draws Buzz, supra
note 52.
57. Press Release, Ocean Tomo, World's First Live, Multi-Lot Patent Auction Exceeding
Expectations (Aug. 5, 2006), http://www.oceantomo.com/auctionresults.html; see Ocean Tomo,
Auction Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.oceantomo.com/auctionsFAQ.html (print on file
with author).
58. See Ocean Tomo, Open Call for IP Submissions, http://69.59.189.170/auctions/
submissionl.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
59. See OCEAN TOMO, SPRING 2006 PATENT AUCTION, supra note 53, at 9; see also Patentrat-
ing.com, http://www.patentrating.com (last visted Sept. 1, 2006).
60. See Ocean Tomo, Auction Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57, at 13.
61. Id. at 14.
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Ocean Tomo's first auction offered patents from patentees including
Motorola, Clorox, The University of California and Ford Motor Com-
pany.62 Bids ranged from $2,000 to $1.9 million, and attendees included
GE, DuPont, Microsoft, Nokia, Kodak, IBM, AT&T and some who bid
anonymously. 63 Ocean Tomo declared its own first auction a success,
stating, "We are now poised to make a true market for intellectual prop-
erty liquidity a reality." 64 When combined with certain sales that were
negotiated post-auction, about forty percent of the offered patents had
been sold.65
Ocean Tomo touts the benefits of a patent auction over individual-
ized negotiation as a means to transfer intellectual property rights, ex-
plaining "the live auction creates a sense of urgency and closure to the
sales process it keeps the assets in public forum which result in a bidding
war, and shifts the burden to purchase from the sellers to the buyers. 66
At the same time, Ocean Tomo views auctions as means to create a mar-
ket for patents as assets, in other words as "a stepping stone to a new way
of thinking about invention" and to "help people to become more accus-
tomed to buying and selling intellectual property., 67 Ocean Tomo's ef-
forts serve as one example of a transition to a market where patents are
used as liquid assets.
2. Acacia Research Corp.
Acacia Research Corp. was founded in 1995 as a venture capital
firm, shifting focus in 2001 to concentrate on patents after earning $26
million from licensing technology. 68  Currently, Acacia is a publicly
traded company that includes a division that liquidizes patents on a large
scale, controlling over 160 U.S. patents through subsidiaries and holding
companies which are estimated to be valued at over $19,600,000.69 In a
recent filing, Acacia reported licensing revenues of $4.7 million for the
first three months of 2006.70 Acacia also reports thirty-one (31) ongoing
patent infringement lawsuits, some of which name multiple alleged in-
62. See GREENBERG TAURIG, supra note 50.
64. OCEAN TOMO, SPRING 2006 PATENT AUCTION, supra note 53, at 6.
65. See Kanellos, supra note 38.
66. Ocean Tomo, Auction Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 57.
67. First Patent Auction Draws Buzz, supra note 52 (quoting Jim Malackowksi, CEO of
Ocean Tomo's Auction division).
68. L. Gannes, Q&A: Acacia's Paul Ryan, REDHERRING.COM, July 9, 2006,
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a=l7514&hed=Q%26amp%3BA%3A+AcaciaE2%80%9
9s+Paul+Ryan&sector=QAndA&subsector=Executives.
69. Acacia Research Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4, 11 (May 10, 2006).
70. Id. at 39.
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fringers. 7  Acacia claims to have settled lawsuits against over two hun-
dred companies.72
In response to criticisms,73 Acacia points out that their business
model helps inventors who lack resources to enforce their patent rights,
explaining that, "[w]hat we are doing is leveling the playing field by
giving inventors the opportunity to monetize all of their hard work.,
74
Additionally, Acacia states that patent licensing serves companies with
expertise in inventing and innovating, rather than commercialization and
marketing.75
3. Intellectual Ventures
Intellectual Ventures is a privately held company that was founded
in 2000 by two former software executives, including Nathan Myhrvold,
who formerly oversaw Microsoft's two billion dollar research and devel-
opment budget.76 Intellectual Ventures views itself as a type of market
maker that has "set out to amass one of the biggest holdings of patents in
the information technology world," as "part of a plan to create a new
investment market" around patents.77
Intellectual Ventures' patenting strategy is built on acquiring a high
volume of patents in a broad spectrum of industries.
Intellectual Ventures acquires patents from other inventors, report-
edly thousands of them.79 Additionally, the company works with both
staff and external engineers and scientists to conceive and patent inven-
tions, filing five hundred patent applications to date.80 Intellectual Ven-
tures does not currently commercialize, but professes plans to later create
spin-off companies to develop, commercialize and manufacture products
based on its patents 81 and to generate revenue by licensing the patents
that Intellectual Ventures has acquired.82 Others are more skeptical of
Intellectual Ventures' plans, anticipating that asserting enforcement liti-
71. Id. at 40-42.
72. See Charles Cooper, Have Patent, Will Sue, CINET NEWS.COM, July 10, 2006,
http://news.com.comlHave+patent/o2C+will+sue/2008-1014_3-6091975.html.
73. See, e.g., Zachary Roth, Patent Troll Menace, WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June 2005,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0506.rothsidebar2.html.
74. Daily, supra note 31.
75. See Gannes, supra note 68.
76. See Ken Auletta, The Microsoft Provocateur, THE NEW YORKER, May 12, 1997, at 66-67.
77. Richard Waters, Invention Shop or Patent Troll Factory, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 25,
2006, at 10.
78. Lisa Lerer, Tech World Worries as Company's Patent Stockpile Grows, IP LAW AND
BUSINESS, June 14, 2006, at 32-33; see also Intellectual Ventures, http://intellectualventures.com
("Our current focus is on developing our invention portfolio.").
79. Brad Stone, Factory of the Future?, NEWSWEEK.COM, Nov. 22, 2004, at 60; see also
Lerer, supra note 78, at 32.
80. Press Release, Intellectual Ventures, Intellectual Ventures Files 500"' Patent Application
(June 26, 2006) (on file with author).
81. Id.
82. Nicholas Varchaver, Who's Afraid of Nathan Myhrvold?, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 110.
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gation will necessarily follow.83 Regardless, Intellectual Ventures de-
votes a significant portion of its business toward patents as liquid assets.
D. An Incentive to Liquidize
Although critics accuse liquid patent holders of trolling or abusing
the patent system, established rules of the patent system presently sup-
port the use of patents for private benefit. The law authorizes private
assignments of patent rights.84 According to Congress, a patent has "the
attributes of personal property., 85 Some courts have likewise character-
ized the patent right as a property right86 that is intended to create incen-
tives for invention and investment.87 As such, the patent right fits within
the classic legal definition of an entitlement subject to transfer without
government intervention for a privately negotiated value.88
The ability to transfer the patent right for profit is well established.
For example, the 1888 case Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co.,89
describes patent rights transferred by a solo inventor to a company "com-
posed of leading business men from all parts of the country," who pooled
five million dollars to establish a telephone company that would "cer-
tainly result in the driving out of all telephones in the market, save the
ones they hold, or else the compelling the Gray, Bell, and Edison lines to
pay the new company a munificent royalty." 90 Dolbear is an early ex-
ample of a solo inventor seeking to use a patent to obtain a financial re-
turn through transfer.
83. Id. (citing Joe Beyers and Shane Robison of Hewlett-Packard).
84. 35 U.S.C.A § 261 (West 2006).
85. Id. ("Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal
property.").
86. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States., 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945) (observing that "a
patent is property... "); Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition of 'property."'); see
also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (explaining
that the patent laws provide "a temporary monopoly ... [which] is a property right.").
87. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting J. BENTHAM,
THEORY OF LEGISLATION, chs. 7-10 (6th ed. 1890). Specifically, the Paltex court described patent
rights with reference to Bentham's justification for property as follows: "It is supposed that men will
not labor diligently or invest freely unless they know they can depend on rules which assure them
that they will indeed be permitted to enjoy a substantial share of the product as the price of their
labor or their risk of savings."
88. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972) (describing one form
of property as a government granted entitlement that can be transferred on the basis of an individu-
ally negotiated price).
89. 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
90. Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 549. The inventor who claimed priority was described as a "poor
mechanic" who "[o]wing to his poverty," "was unable to push his patent on the market" using his
own resources. Id. Ultimately, the "poor mechanic" lost the priority battle to the patent obtained by
Alexander Graham Bell. Id. at 567.
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From a number of perspectives, significant social benefits derive
from the transferability of intellectual property rights.91 Today, research
for more complex technology frequently requires a significant monetary
investment, multiple inventors and firms that can foster inventive activ-
ity. Some benefits derive from a firm's ability to combine large financial
resources with the work of employee inventors.92 In a typical scenario,
the employees work under patent rules authorizing assignment or pursu-
ant to common law shop rights that transfer the invention to the firm.93
The firm seeks a patent and develops a product or service based on the
invention disclosed in the patent application.94 The patent is granted, and
the patentee is able to exclude competitors and thereby charge a suffi-
ciently high price for the product to enable recovery of the investment in
the research and development of the product. 9'
Patent transfers may be necessary to facilitate innovation. 96 For ex-
ample, a typical model to bring an idea to a commercial market may re-
quire the effort of several companies which must obtain rights to the pat-
ent to bring a product to market. 97 For example, basic research may be
performed at universities or research laboratories. 98 Some percentage of
these inventions may be transitioned to a small company, which incu-
bates the idea and undertakes the risk of taking the idea toward a "com-
mercially viable" product or service.99 A larger company may then un-
dertake late-stage product development and market access. 00 Creating
91. See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1727, 1740 (2000) (recognizing that transferability permits
inventors to capitalize on inventions). Kitch states
It is clear that the ability of owners of intellectual property rights to transfer these rights
in whole or in part is an important feature of the systems. The rights can easily arise in
the hands of persons or firms who are not in the best position to exploit them. In order to
involve others in the full exploitation of the economic potential of the right, the owners
must be able to enter into a wide range of arrangements with other firms.
Id.
Permitting inventors to assign or license patent rights may permit more inventions to reach consum-
ers in the form of commercialized products.
92. See Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 15 (2004)
(discussing the lack of a "work made for hire provision" in current United States patent law).
93. Id.
94. King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941,950 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
95. Id.; see also F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 708-09 (2001) (discussing the need to develop inventions "into
some commercial embodiment").
96. The distinction between the terms invention and innovation highlights how a patent is
different from a final, commercial product. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success And Patent
Standards: Economic Perspectives On Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REv. 805, 807 (1988) (An invention
refers to an inventor's idea as patented. By contrast, an innovation is the "functional version of the
invention: the version first offered for sale.").
97. Developments in Nanotechnology: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation (Feb. 15, 2006), at 1 (Statement of Dr. Todd L. Hylton, Director, Ctr. for






alliances and relations through patent transferability rules among these
different entities thus may be crucial to the full development of a single
idea. Such collaboration will be even more critical for new fields of re-
search and development, such as nanotechnology, 10 which requires sig-
nificant research and development costs.
Another alternative to facilitate innovation is a cross-license be-
tween firms that allows freedom to operate without concern over patent
lawsuits. 10 2 A cross-license permits two companies to carry out product
design and manufacture based on non-exclusive cross-licenses to the
intellectual property of the other.10 3 In contrast to liquid patents, these
examples of the alienation of patent rights assist product or service de-
velopment that may inure to the benefit of the public.
Few would argue that the transfer of patents should be prohibited
because such transfers may be critical to the growth of innovation. The
patent statute explicitly authorizes patent transfers.' 0 4 As a system based
on economic and commercial principles, patent transfers do not carry the
same difficult moral and societal freight that warrant the prohibition on
transfers of voting rights, human organs or illegal substances. 105
Patent licenses also offer benefits to the inventor. 0 6 Facilitating in-
formation transfers through patent assignments have benefits such as
certainty and efficiency, particularly compared to trade secret transfers
which are typically encumbered by confidentiality agreements, monitor-
ing mechanisms and ownership uncertainty.'0 7 Preventing the transfer of
information may create undesirable societal effects. For example, im-
101. Id. at 2 (noting the long lead time and significant investment necessary for nanotechnol-
ogy research, which can be expected to require a more complex and interdependent business and
funding model).
102. Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations In The Intellectual Property Protection
Of Software, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 n. 173 (1994) (discussing the award of a cross-license to smaller
firm).
103. Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited, An Empiri-
cal Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 109-
110 (2001) (discussing the use of patents for cross-license bargaining).
104. 35 U.S.C.A. § 261 (West 2006).
105. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1854-55 (1987)
(explaining that "market-inalienability negates a central element of traditional property rights").
106. DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 101-02 (2000). Teece notes that
patent holders enjoy a number of benefits by contracting their intellectual property rights. These
include permitting the innovator to have the benefits of a commercialized invention without incur-
ring the cost of the assets needed to incorporate the invention into a product, which reduces both risk
and cash requirements. Id. In addition, Professor Teece notes that "contractual relationships can
bring added credibility to the innovator, especially if the innovator is relatively unknown when the
contractual partner is established and viable." Id. at 10 1.
107. Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Cost Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473,482 (2005)
(explaining that "partitioning an information asset through contract law and secrecy can be vastly
more complex and costly").
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peding or barring assignments may force inventors into becoming man-
agers of those rights, even if ill-suited for that role.
108
At the same time, the private transfer of patent rights causes con-
cern because control over the exclusive use of an idea has far broader
implications than a typical private transfer of goods. 109 This is because
patents have the potential to impact competition, society and future inno-
vation. As has long been recognized, the patent system is fundamentally
intended to benefit the public."'0 Availability may affect such vital issues
as public health,"' education 1 2 and communication, 13 among other
things.
In effect, the patent rules create an incentive for inventors to liquid-
ize, a circumstance that is perhaps inadvertent on behalf of those who
create and implement patent law. The patent system readily permits pri-
vate patent transfers, which carry the right to enforce against innocent
infringers and which have enormous potential to impact public welfare
and the future of innovation.
Such transfers have the ability to affect society and have a potential
for abuse. Patent owners can single-handedly control an entire area of
research merely by paying the price to which an inventor agrees. A solo
inventor or nearly bankrupt inventing company finds such transfers not
only profitable, but many find undertaking the risk of bringing an inven-
tion to market impossible. Transfers of otherwise unused patent rights
may be profitable, providing an incentive to the fruits of research and
development into the hands of those primarily interested in private gain.
108. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications For Intellectual Property, 71
U. CHI. L. REv. 129, 137-38 (2004) (noting that "[c]reators are often terrible managers").
109. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, And Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside The
Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 224 (2002) (A patent "is not a private contract between two par-
ties, but rather a property right that impacts all competition in a given technology.").
110. See Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1859).
It is undeniably true, that the limited and temporary monopoly granted to inventors was
never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage; the benefit to the public or com-
munity at large was another and doubtless the primary object in granting and securing
that monopoly. This was at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed
by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts
for the same important objects.
Id.
111. Medecins Sans Frontieres, A Matter of Life and Death: The Role of Patents in Access to
Essential Medicines, Nov. 2001, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/
reports/2001/doha-l 1-2001.pdf (arguing that "[p]atents can become obstacles in providing afford-
able treatment... "); see Keith Bradsher, Pressure Rises on Producer of a Flu Drug, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2005, at 1 (describing international controversy over access to vaccine against avian flu
pandemic, which is covered by a patent owned by Swiss pharmaceutical maker Roche).
112. Corey Murray, Schools Targeted In Streaming Video Patent Claim, ESCHOOL NEWS
ONLINE, Mar. 3, 2004, http://www.eschoolnews.com/news/showStory.cfm?ArticlelD=4937 (detail-
ing Acacia Research Corp.'s assertion of patent claims against university distance learning pro-
grams).
113. Tom Krazit & Anne Broache, Blackberry Saved, CINET NEWS.COM, Mar. 3, 2006,
http://news.com.com/BlackBerry+saved/2100-1047_3-6045880.html (describing settlement of
patent dispute that appeared on the verge of shutting down wireless email communication system).
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II. PATENT POLICIES THAT FOSTER THE PERSISTENCE OF
LIQUID PATENTS
Some insight into specific provisions of existing patent law shed
light on how liquid patents have facilitated-and perhaps even encour-
aged-liquid patent holders to use patents as assets. These provisions
are the result of policy decisions made about the historic uses of patents
as intended to create "new jobs and new industries, new consumer goods
and trade benefits."'"14 The cumulative effect of these doctrines is that
liquid patent holders obtain their advantages without providing the socie-
tal benefits that these rules were intended to foster.
A. The Patent as Monolith: A Uniform System of Rights
Patent law has been viewed as an area of law where uniformity of
application matters, although the extent to which uniformity should be
permitted has been the subject of some controversy. The U.S. Federal
Court of Appeals, which exercises jurisdiction over all patent appeals for
the federal courts within the U.S., was formed by Congress in 1982 with
the express purpose of enhancing uniformity in the administration of the
patent system. 1 5 This change has been observed to "have increased the
respect enjoyed by patents in the United States and the value patents
command in the global economy" and to have played in important part in
the development of the U.S. economy.'l 6 With these important princi-
ples at stake, the Federal Circuit treats patent rights as "central to the ne
information-age economy in the United States and ... as having signifi-
cant value as intellectual assets."' 17 Further, the Federal Circuit has been
noted to have a pro-patent bias. 
1 8
As purchasers of these favored rights, liquid patent holders are the
recipients of this system of strengthened rights. At present, the patent
right is viewed as a document that is valuable and derives value from
immutability. 119 Once crystallized into a right, a patent's strength does
114. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
115. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1295 (West 2006) (providing that the U.S. Court of Appeals has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over appeals of patent cases decided in the U.S. District Courts); Richard Linn, The
Future Role of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Now That It Has Turned
21, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 732 (2004) (Federal Circuit jurist noting the court's "mission to bring
understanding and uniformity to judicial interpretations of the patent statutes").
116. Linn, supra note 115, at 734-35; see also Fed. Trade Comm'n. To Promote Innovation:
The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, Executive Summary, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 861, 865 (2004) ("The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the sole court for most
patent law appeals, has brought stability and increased predictability to various elements of patent
law.").
117. Linn, supra note 115, at 734.
118. Id. at 734 (recognizing the criticism that the court favors of patentees, and stating, "I
admit to some bias....").
119. Id. at 735 (noting the "reflection in the court's opinions of the value patents command as
legal documents, deserving of full and fair consideration by the courts and entitled to
enforcement").
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not vary based on differences in use, lack of use or ownership. As dis-
cussed in a recent article:
Patents are bundles of rights, the most important of which is the right
to exclude others from practicing the invention. Whether for business
reasons, spite, or pure stupidity, a patent owner can exclude others
from using his property, much as a land owner can keep out trespass-
ers. A purchaser at auction, therefore, will have no rights different
from or in addition to those of the original owner. The new owner
may commercialize the invention or not as he wishes.
120
The Federal Circuit's administration of patent law has exhibited a
trend toward preferring the promulgation of rules over flexible standards,
emphasizing certainty and predictability. 12' Uniformity has unquestion-
able benefits. Generally, the use of such rules fosters a sense of equal
treatment consistent with a sense of justice and fair play, enhances pre-
dictability, and acts as a check on the judiciary and the influence of pub-
lic will into the rule of law. 122 The commercial context in which much
patent law operates has contributed to the perception that stability is a
necessary component for application.
23
As explained by now-Chief Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit,
creating law for patent rights can be analogized to a country's efforts to
draw borders based on citizenship. 24 According to Judge Michel, flexi-
bility inherent in case-by-case determinations is undesirable because of
the tendency of decision-makers to interject subjectivity in drawing lines
and also because variation creates uncertainty among those trying to fix
their own legal citizenship status. 125 Applying Judge Michel's analogy to
the patent system leads to the concern that patent examiners, prospective
patentees, their competitors and the public enjoy benefits from a uniform,
predictable system that does not always require redress from the
courts. 1
26
According to Judge Michel, absent such predictability, the Federal
Circuit is in danger of impeding "the very commerce our court was cre-
120. Evans & Dolin, supra note 51.
121. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 Am. U. L. REV. 771, 792-93 (2003)
("The Federal Circuit seems ever more prone to the pronouncement of categorical rules meant to
govern future patent disputes.").
122. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
123. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial Activism?, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 683, 687 (1993) ("Like all commercial law, the cost of guessing wrong about the law and
its application is rarely recoverable. The responsibility placed on the Federal Circuit mirrors that
placed on all courts, for a useful and reliable law requires that the law is known and knowable.").
124. Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit Juris-
prudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1994).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1233-35; cf Paul M. Janicke, Do We Really Need So Many Mental And Emotional
States in United States Patent Law?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279, 296-97 (2000) (arguing that
case-by-case determinations made based on the inventor's or infringer's mental state encumbers the
adjudication of patent disputes and makes such litigation too expensive and complicated).
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ated to promote."' 127  Proponents of uniform application of patent law
principles stress that consistency helps a number of those affected by
patent rights. 28 Uncertainty about the categorization of rights creates
difficulties for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's patent examiners
who must determine whether to grant patent rights in the first instance. 1
29
Once fixed, the patent right remains unchanged as the patent is li-
censed or assigned. Unlike other legal rights in which the plaintiffs
circumstances are legally relevant to the existence of the plaintiffs right
to recover,1 30 the patent right is embodied in the document which leaves
the patent's owner entirely out of the picture. A liquid patent holder can
purchase, sell, license and assert the patent without concern that the
scope of the right is changed or diminished by any of this activity.
The uniformity with which the patent system has been administered
has inured to the benefit of liquid patent holders. There are few, if any,
policy-based exceptions to the administration of the patent law. The
system, established for the benefit of inventors, society and the economy
more generally, carries all of these rights forward when the patent right is
transferred.
B. Patent Enforcement
The right to enforce the patent right has been economically justified
as a means to prevent free-riding from significant invention investments.
According to theorists, patent law's protection for a patentee against in-
fringers who independently developed their products is supported by the
necessity to maintain a reward for initial inventor who may have made a
high level of investment in the invention. As explained by William Lan-
des and Judge Richard Posner:
If patents did not protect against independent duplication, then an in-
ventor who had spent enormous sums to be the first to discover some
useful new idea might find himself unable to recoup his costs be-
cause someone else, working independently toward the same goal,
127. Michel, supra note 124, at 1233, 1235, 1242 (recognizing that infringement decisions
"may lead to plant closings or even business failures.").
128. Id. at 1234-35.
129. Id. at 1233-34.
130. In this regard, patent law stands in contrast to trademark law, where the trademark
owner's conduct in using the trademark within particular channels of commerce is relevant to
whether there is a likelihood of confusion with the defendant's use of a mark. See e.g., Malletier v.
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 539 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing the impor-
tance of analyzing effect on consumers in the markets for both the mark holder and the accused
infringer); Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (listing the
respective parties' marketing channels as relevant to whether there is a likelihood of confusion as the
test for trademark infringement).
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had duplicated his discovery within weeks or months after he made
it. 131
Landes and Posner's rationale justifies maximum levels of patent
protection most neatly for innovations which are expensive or time-
consuming to develop.1
32
However, liability for patent infringement extends much further,
encompassing implementations that have been independently developed
by the innocent infringers, where no free riding has or could have oc-
curred. Specifically, patent infringement is demonstrated by a compari-
son between the patent claim and the accused device, method or proc-
ess. 133  Infringement acts essentially as strict liability under tort law-
that is, if the accused device incorporates the claim elements then in-
fringement is found. 134 There is no requirement for a patent holder to
show that the infringer actually copied the invention in order for liability
to exist. 135 Patent infringement can be established where the infringer
has independently developed the technology that is the subject of the
patent holder's claim.' 36  If the accused device includes the invention
stated in the patent claims, the fact that the infringer included additional
innovations or improvements does not preclude a finding of patent in-
fringement.
137
Further, patent law does not distinguish levels of protection based
on the level of investment required for the development of the invention.
The patent protection afforded to a life-saving pharmaceutical 3 8 which
requires hundreds of millions of dollars to develop is entitled to the same
strength of protection as a fortuitously conceived invention.1 39 One fa-
mous example is the invention of Teflon, invented in an experiment gone
awry and ultimately incorporated into "everything from space capsules to
131. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 295-96 (2003). Landes and Posner point out that this protection
comes at an economic cost, because the rule "fosters patent races and the rent-seeking costs that such
races can impose." Id. at 296.
132. See generally SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATIONS AND INCENTIVES 16, 27 (2004)
(recognizing the high cost of developing increasingly complex technological solutions).
133. See, e.g., Kahn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 135 F.3d 1472, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing
standard for determining patent infringement as a comparison of the claims with the accused device).
134. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 401 n.8, 408 (2006); cf Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandno-
ble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (refusing to construe a claim element as requir-
ing any state of mind on the part of the infringer).
135. Holbrook, supra note 134, at 401 n.8; see also Amazon.com, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1353 (refus-
ing to construe a claim element as requiring any state of mind on the part of the infringer).
136. Holbrook, supra note 134, at 401 n.8.
137. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
138. See, e.g., Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug (2006),
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/cost.htm (estimating that costs to develop a new phar-
maceutical through delivery to customers range from $800 million to $2 billion).
139. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 2006) ("Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made.").
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heart valves to frying pans" and patented in 1941.14° Patentability does
not require inquiry into the level of investment made by the patentee.
Additionally, the value, significance of the invention or the likeli-
hood that a particular invention might be appropriated is not relevant to
patentability.' 4' As a practical effect, the reward policies that protect
incentives for the most expensive, valuable inventions set the level of
legal protection for all patents.
Liquid patent holders benefit from these policies by seeking to
maximize the obtainable profit for the lowest possible sum, perhaps more
than the patent is worth based on an objective market measure. A liquid
patentee can assert the patent against any infringer, including those who
are innocently infringing. A liquid patent holder has the luxury of hold-
ing onto the patent, waiting to determine which infringers are going to be
successful enough to pursue, as the patentability remains the same until
the patent expires. Indeed, a liquid patent holder's damages may be
driven upward by infringers who have experienced market success after
infringement has begun 142 and may become locked into a particular de-
sign once the market has accepted their product.
43
Although the patent system rests on the prevention of free riding to
protect significant incentives to invest in innovation, the system is ad-
ministered with uniformity into areas where such policy considerations
are factually absent. A liquid patent holder who purchases a patent right
at low cost may assert the patent against an innocent infringer. Liquid
patent owners thereby obtain the benefit of an economic policy justifica-
tion for the patent system even where such justifications have no place in
their practice.
C. The Utility Standard
35 U.S.C. section 101 requires that inventions be "useful" as a con-
dition to patentability. 44 An appropriate level of patentability requires
sensitivity to several underlying considerations. The trajectory of devel-
opment ranges from the thought of a problem to be solved on one end of
the spectrum, to a fully developed, commercialized product on the other
end. The transition from one side of the spectrum to the other may take
time, financial resources, research and development. When determining
140. See Robert Friedel, The Accidental Inventor, DISCOVER, Oct. 1996, at 58, available at
http://www.discover.com/issues/oct-96/features/theaccidentalinv893 (describing Roy Plunkett's
accidental invention of Teflon, which occurred while Plunkett was researching a new type of Freon);
U.S. Patent No. 2,230,654 (filed Feb. 4, 1941) (Plunkett's original Teflon patent).
141. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 131, at 300.
142. Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (indicating that courts can consider post-infringement sales in determining royalty
awards).
143. See Reitzig et al., supra note 21.
144. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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where on the spectrum to set the utility standard, courts are making a
normative choice that influences a potential patentee's ability to obtain
legal protection during a particular phase of development.
A utility standard that would grant patents for abstract ideas has the
potential to harm innovation by granting a right to exclude others who
may wish to research and develop within a new field, without providing
a sufficient social benefit.' 45 On the other hand, a utility standard might
be set which requires a fully developed, commercialized product for a
patent grant to issue. In In re Brana,146 the Federal Circuit rejected this
view, recognizing that usefulness "necessarily includes the expectation
of further research and development" in the context of a pharmaceutical
invention. 147 The Brana court reasoned that a contrary rule and its "as-
sociated costs would prevent many companies from obtaining patent
protection on promising new inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive
to pursue, through research and development, potential cures in many
,,148crucial areas ....
Courts such as Brana have established a rule of law based on cer-
tain assumptions about how patents will be used which are not sustained
by the use of liquid patents. Certainly in a traditional invention-
innovation-commercialization cycle, the court's reasoning is sound and
demonstrates how the patent system can lead to tremendous public bene-
fits. However, liquid patent holders do not attempt to deliver on any
promise of further research and development. Although the utility stan-
dard is set low enough in anticipation of further efforts at commercializa-
tion, liquid patent holders seek revenue by asserting patents against com-
panies that have commercialized successfully.
D. Unifonn Construction of the Patent Right
The strength, scope and nature of the patent right is viewed as one
that should be objectively verifiable from the four corners of the patent
itself and the public record of the patent's prosecution history whenever
possible. For example, the doctrines surrounding patent interpretation
favor the use of the four corners of the patent as the fundamental starting
point. 149 Considerations which might be deemed "subjective" in the
sense that these matters are outside the patent and prosecution history,
145. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (explaining that a low standard of
utility "may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating
benefit to the public.") (footnote omitted).
146. 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
147. In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1568.
148. Id. Brana, which considered an invention in the pharmaceutical area, is arguably at odds
with the higher utility standard that the U.S. Supreme Court sought to establish in Brenner. See
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law And Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53
VAND. L. R. 2081, 2087 (2000) (recognizing a conflict between the Brenner and Brana standards for
utility).
149. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) ("A patent is
a legal instrument, to be construed, like other legal instruments, according to its tenor ....").
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such as inventor, expert or lay witness testimony about the meaning of
patent claims, are considered the exception rather than the rule.' 50
In Phillips v. A WH Corp.,151 the Federal Circuit set forth a hierarchy
of interpretive sources for the interpretation of patent claims that relies
most centrally on the intrinsic patent document. 52 There, the court reaf-
firmed the primacy of the patent claim as delineating the meaning and
scope of a patent claim.' 53  In Phillips, the Federal Circuit further recog-
nized that the claims must be considered in light of the patent specifica-
tion.' 54 Phillips places the strongest emphasis on these two interpretative
sources-the patent claims and the written specification, both of which
appear within the four comers of the patent document- for determining
the scope of the patent right. 55 Evidence that is extrinsic to the patent,
such as expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and treatises, are
lower on the hierarchy of determining the meaning of patents. 
56
The necessity for resting the meaning of the patent on the claims,
written description and prosecution history has been viewed as a critical
feature for placing the public on notice of the metes and bounds of the
patent right. 57  The Phillips court outlined reasons that extrinsic evi-
dence is disfavored and viewed with some suspicion. For example, Phil-
lips viewed expert evidence as testimony created for litigation that "thus
can suffer from bias."'
158
150. Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-89. In Markman, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the conten-
tion that a jury-rather than a judge-should interpret the claims of a patent. Id. In doing so, the
U.S. Supreme Court explained that cases the court was "doubtful that trial courts will run into many
cases" in which witness credibility determinations were critical, stating, "[i]n the main, we expect,
any credibility determinations will be subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the
whole document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way
that comports with the instrument as a whole." Id. at 389.
151. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
152. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312.
153. Id. ("It is a 'bedrock principle' of patent law that the 'claims of a patent define the inven-
tion to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude."') (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v.
Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
154. Id. at 1314-15 (noting that claims "are part of 'a fully integrated written instrument,'
consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the claims. For that reason, claims 'must
be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part."') (citation omitted) (quoting Herbert
Markman & Positek, Inc. v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
155. Id. at 1315 ("[Tlhe specification 'is always highly relevant to the claim construction
analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term."')
(citation omitted) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
156. Id. at 1318-19; see also N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (suggesting that generally, the inventor's testimony as to the meaning of the patent
claims is not considered a relevant interpretive source).
157. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 ("Because the patentee is required to 'define precisely
what his invention is ... it is unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a
manner different from the plain import of its terms."') (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52
(1886)).
158. Id. at 1318.
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Phillips also recognized that relying on extrinsic sources of infor-
mation undermines "the public notice function of patents., 159 The public
notice function of patent claims has been viewed as important to the pat-
ent system's goal of encouraging innovation. As the U.S. Supreme Court
explains: "The monopoly is a property right; and like any property right,
its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essential to promote pro-
gress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation. A patent
holder should know what he owns, and the public should know what he
does not."'
160
The Federal Circuit's reliance on the four comers of the patent gives
the patent right a monolithic quality.16' The objective rules of patent
interpretation militate toward a meaning that becomes crystallized into
the patent document that is as immutable as engraving in stone. 162  One
who purchases the right can therefore be assured that no change in scope
or meaning will occur due to the patent's transfer.
E. The Headless Patentee
As set forth in the U.S. Constitution, the patent system was con-
ceived as an incentive for inventors. 163 Giles Rich, a patent jurist and
influential author in the patent field, presents this tongue-in-cheek view:
The inventor labors in his garret and brings forth something new and
useful and beyond the capabilities of the ordinary worker in his field.
He has spent his small savings and deprived himself and his family of
comforts and invested much of his time. He has bettered the lot of
mankind in some way. There is an instinct in human nature which
holds him entitled to a reward or compensation for his achievement,
partly out of gratitude, partly from a sense of fairness which engen-
ders the feeling that he should be repaid his investment of time and
164money.
That such effort should be sheltered from the rigors of competition
and rewarded through the grant of a valuable right is a powerful theme in
159. Id. at 1319.
160. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002).
161. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim Con-
struction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 123, 133 (2005) (noting that the Federal Circuit "trumpets in
mantra fashion the public notice function served by a patent and its prosecution history, offering
formalistic rules to protect against the evisceration of this policy objective").
162. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2000)
(describing a hyper-textual approach to claim construction).
163. Eldred v. Ashcrofl, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (stating "that '[p]atents are not given as
favors.., but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a
term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention."') (quoting Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 299 (1964); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1966) (describing the patent system as "a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge").
164. Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and The Anti-Monopoly Laws, 14
FED. CIR. B.J. 21, 32 (2004). Rich stated that he believed that relying on the inventor "as inventor as
though he were the principal character in this economic drama" was "a great mistake." Id.
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patent jurisprudence. 65 This imagery is particularly prevalent in cases
decided before the 1952 amendments to the Patent Act. At that time, the
"flash of creative genius" standard was used to determine the minimum
standard of novelty for patentability. 166 The cases analyzed the inventive
process in vivid detail, attempting to define circumstances under which it
might be determined whether the inventor had "perceive[d] the vital for-
ward step to which predecessors had been blind.''167  Courts analogized
to Edison's inventive process, including reliance on such maxims as
"genius as '2% inspiration and 98% perspiration""' 168 and "genius has
well been defined as 'an infinite capacity for taking pains."",
169
Although the 1952 Patent Act attempted to establish objective crite-
ria for inventions, 7° the language of a reward for the inventor as a crea-
tive genius still resonates within court decisions. For example, in Eldred
v. Ashcroft,171 the Supreme Court has reiterated that the purpose of the
constitutional provision supporting the patent system is "by holding out a
reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to
their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius...
,,172 Similarly, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, ' 3 the court under-
scored that a patent's meaning must be defined for "[t]he encouragement
of the inventive genius of others ....
Modem courts maintain these assumptions in generalized terms,
without a subjective inquiry into the actual inventor's state of mind ex-
cept for some limited circumstances. 175  This is because individualized
inquiries into an inventor's subjective mental states have been seen as
165. The use of narrative imagery as a device in judicial reasoning has been explored in legal
literature. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories": Narrative's Implications
for Moral Rights and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2001) (describ-
ing the use of narrative in copyright cases).
166. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) ("That is to say
the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the
skill of the calling. If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on the public domain.").
167. See, e.g., Trabon Eng'g Corp. v. Dirkes, 136 F.2d 24, 27 (6th Cir. 1943).
168. Trabon Eng'g Corp., 136 F.2d at 28.
169. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Consol. Expanded Metal Cos., 130 F.2d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 1942).
170. Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention " as Replaced by §103 of The 1952 Pat-
ent Act, 14 FED CIR. B. J. 147, 158-59 (2004) (describing the amendments to the 1952 Patent Act).
171. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
172. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224 (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829)).
173. 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
174. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S.
364, 369 (1938)).
175. Some aspects of the inventor's state of mind are relevant to U.S. patent law. See, e.g.,
Janicke, supra note 126. These include establishing the date of conception of an invention. 35
U.S.C.A. § 102(g) (West 2006). Another example is the statutory disclosure requirement, which
mandates that the patent disclose the inventor's subjective best mode of making the invention. 35
U.S.C.A. § 112 (requiring that the patent specification "set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention").
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interfering with the objective nature of the patent right.1 76 Additionally,
subjective inquiries are viewed as introducing unnecessary factual com-
plexity and expense into the litigation of patent cases.
177
The synergy between the perception of the inventor as genius and
the view that subjective inquiries are disfavored leads to a curious the-
matic presumption that the patent system protects a creative genius even
where the actual inventor has no such qualities. More significantly for
the purpose of this analysis, patent owners are not considered at all in the
patentability inquiry, yet as recipients of all rights to the patent get all of
the attendant presumptions and benefits that the patent system provides.
In many ways, the true patentee becomes invisible. Instead, the inven-
tive genius takes the actual patentee's place as the driver of the justifica-
tions for the patent right.
Simplification and certainty are considered primary goals of patent
law, but this view operates to mask that not every inventor is Thomas
Edison and that not every patentee owner is interested in the larger goals
of society and innovation. The patent system is build on the assumption
that the inventor must be rewarded and protected, an assumption that has
created a system that benefits liquid patent owners who use patents for
individual gain. An emphasis on patents as a purely objective, stream-
lined system without inquiry into the circumstances of invention (or, into
ownership) thus furthers the liquid patent's goal to create private wealth.
III. WHETHER LIQUID PATENTS SHOULD BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY:
THE DEBATE OVER INDIVIDUALIZED VERSUS UNIFORM PATENT RIGHTS
Over the past several years, there has been some debate over
whether more individualized treatment of patent law would better effec-
tuate patent policy. These arguments shed light on whether different
rules for liquid patent holders should be developed to curb the potential
for abuses of the system and to maintain the patent system's consistent
goal of encouraging invention.
As previously outlined, stability and predictability is the Federal
Circuit's primary and clear goal. 78 More individualized treatments of
patents have been proposed. One example is Professor A. Samuel
Oddi's proposal to establish an alternative to the present utility patent
176. Janicke, supra note 126, at 296 (questioning "whether, by insisting on conduct norms in
the form of mental states embedded in patent law, the U.S. patent law system is encumbered more
than it needs to be and disproportionately so to any value achieved.").
177. See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 7, 117-23 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
178. Newman, supra note 123, at 688 ("[Ulnless there can be reasonable reliance on legal
advice given during the stages of invention and innovation, unless that advice can correctly predict




system: a patent system for "revolutionary" patents. 179 Professor Oddi's
system would expand the categories of patentable inventions by broaden-
ing the classes of statutory subject matter and lowering the utility re-
quirement. 180 At the same time, Professor Oddi's system would modify
the current novelty and non-obviousness standards to take into account
other characteristics of the proposed invention is considered "revolution-
ary" or "extraordinary" based on the standards set by experts in the field
of endeavor. 181
In return, Oddi proposes that applicants who successfully obtain
revolutionary patents would receive twice the term of protection than is
available for utility patents under current law. 182 Oddi's proposal is in-
tended to further proposition that the patent system produces a net bene-
fit to society where patents are only granted for those inventions induced
by the patent system-that is, patents should only be granted where the
invention "would not have been made but for the availability of pat-
ents."
, 183
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed that patent pol-
icy be implemented in view of competitive policy.184 Specifically, the
FTC proposes that the inquiry of patent law's non-obviousness stan-
dard185 be shifted to consider "whether an invention likely would emerge
in roughly the same time frame - that is, without significant delay - 'but
for' the prospect of a patent."'
186
Another discussion concerning the modification of patent law's uni-
form treatment of innovation include the work of Professors Dan Burk
and Mark Lemley. 187 Burk and Lemley identify various points of the
Federal Circuit's disparate application of certain patent doctrines in the
consideration of biotechnology patent cases when contrasted to the ap-
plication of these same rules to computer software cases. 188 Specifically,
Burk and Lemley state the courts have developed "a unique enclave of
179. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1115 (1989).
180. Id. at 1129-30.
181. Id at 1131-32; see also Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697 F.2d 796, 798 (7th Cir.
1983) (noting that an invention "was entitled to patent protection only if it was the kind of contribu-
tion unlikely to be induced except by the promise of a monopoly, and we do not think it was that
kind of invention, because we think it would have been made anyway, and soon.").
182. Oddi, supra note 179, at 1138-39 ("To provide an incentive for applicants to seek an early
grant, the system should offer either the period of thirty-four years from grant or the longer period of
thirty-six to forty years from the filing date.").
183. Id. at 1101.
184. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7-8 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC PATENT REPORT].
185. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2006).
186. FTC PATENT REPORT, supra note 184, at ch. 4, § II(A)(2).
187. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691 (2004).
188. Id. at 706-07.
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patent doctrine for biotechnology" resting on assumptions about the per-
son of ordinary skill in this art. 189 Burk and Lemley argue that the Fed-
eral Circuit's choices fail to serve innovation in the biotechnology
field. 190 They propose changes to the substantive requirements for pat-
entability in order to facilitate an increased level of biotechnology inven-
tion.' 9' The authors conclude that "as a practical matter, it appears that,
although patent law is technology-neutral in theory, it is technology-
specific in application.'
' 92
The degree of variation that patent law should tolerate is controver-
sial. Each of these proposals for change to the patent system has been
made in the interest of furthering the patent system's goals. Differences
in the administration of patent law create uncertainty and complexity
1 93
and therefore stand in contrast to the congressional purpose in creating
the Federal Circuit.' 94 Likewise in this circumstance, proposed modifica-
tions to accommodate the use of liquid patents should be made only to
the extent that such changes further patent policy.
Developing separate patentability rules for liquid patents is theoreti-
cally possible, of course.' 95 For example, one might condition patent
transfers on approval by a governmental agency, such as the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office. Utility standards for liquid patents could be
raised to prevent potential interference with nascent markets. 196 A fur-
ther proposal might be to create a standard whereby one considered the
patent owner's motives or reasons for asserting the patent in determining
enforceability. Enforceability or remedies might be weakened for those
engaged in licensing programs that have adverse economic consequences
for innovation. Commercializing entities might be permitted an in-
fringement defense of independent development for innocent infringe-
ment. Enforcement against abuses of the patent system could be consid-
ered under alternative causes of action such as through tort or antitrust
theories.
Any proposed changes would be disruptive to the patent system's
goal toward preserving uniformity and objectivity in the patent system.
For example, resting the standards of patentability on subsequent
changes in ownership would interject a significant level of uncertainty
into a decision to invest in invention. Certainly, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office could not be expected to foresee transfer when issuing
189. Id. at 716.
190. Id. at 736-38.
191. Id. at 736-37.
192. Id. at 691.
193. R. Polk Wagner, Exactly Backwards: Exceptionalism and the Federal Circuit, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 749, 755 (2004).
194. Newman, supra note 123, at 688.
195. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2006).
196. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536, (1966) (discussing utility standard, stating "a
patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy").
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patents in the first instance. Rendering the patent right vulnerable to
later changes in ownership may hurt or discourage inventors who wish to
engage in licensing or exchanging patent rights in return for funding that
may be necessary for commercialization. However, such disruption may
be warranted if liquid patents are inconsistent with the patent system's
underlying justifications and Constitutional purpose. An examination of
liquid patents in light of those policies follows.
IV. FOUNDATIONAL PUBLIC POLICIES SERVED BY THE PATENT SYSTEM
Although the creation and enforcement of liquid patents are well
supported as a matter of patent law, their contribution to established pat-
ent policy is far less certain. To the extent that the patent system was
created to facilitate invention and the commercialization of products
which flow from those ideas, the creation of markets for patents as com-
modities seems to fall short. Further, to the extent that the patent system
creates incentives to liquidize, measures should be undertaken to ensure
that the use of patents is not contrary to the fundamental goals of the
patent system.
A. The Constitutional Basis of the Patent Reward as Incentive
Patents are awarded to inventors for the development and disclosure
of ideas that would otherwise be subject to copying.1 97 Over the years,
the incentive for which the patent system offers rewards has been refined
to encourage: 1) invention of new and improved technology; 2) disclo-
sure of this technology to the public; and 3) investment in the commer-
cialization of patented ideas.1
98
The patent as reward has infused U.S. patent policy since its incep-
tion in the U.S. Constitution, which authorized Congress to create the
intellectual property protection "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts . . .. ,,199 As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
But in order to induce him to make that invention public, to give all a
share in the benefits resulting from such an invention, Congress, by
its legislation, made in pursuance of the Constitution, has guaranteed
to him an exclusive right to it for a limited time; and the purpose of
the patent is to protect him in this monopoly, not to give him a use
which, save for the patent, he did not have before, but only to sepa-
rate to him an exclusive use. 20
197. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L.
REv. 305, 310-11 (1992).
198. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissent-
ing).
199. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
200. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897).
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The patent is "a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowl-
edge" to further fields of human endeavor. 201
The reward for the inventor's effects is the limited time period to
202exclude others from making, using, selling or importing the invention.
This period of exclusivity prevents others from practicing the invention
until the patent expires, at which time the invention falls into the public
domain and can be freely practiced by the public without permission of
the patent holder.20 3 Innovators are deemed to develop patentable inven-
tions in expectation of receiving any rewards that can be reaped from the
period of exclusivity.2
In addition to justifying the patent laws as a whole, the patent as an
incentive has also long influenced specific policy choices in the jurispru-
dence of patent law. These include critical components of the patent
system, such as substantive requirements for patentability. 205 Other ex-
amples include the utility requirement, 20 6 inventorship,2°7 and the en-
ablement requirement.20 8 As an additional example, this policy also pro-
vides support for the rule that inventors are the presumptive owners of
their inventions. 0 9
The "reward" that is the heart of the reward theory is the right to
exclude competitors for the entire patent term. As the Federal Circuit
has explained, the patent system depends on the right to exclude as an
essential component of the reward incentive, as "without the right to ex-
clude the express purpose of the Constitution and Congress, to promote
the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously undermined., 210  The
201. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
202. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829) (stating "[w]hile one great object was, by
holding out a reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions
for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was 'to promote the progress
of science and useful arts').
203. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. at 239; see also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933).
204. King Instruments v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[T]he Patent Act creates
an incentive for innovation. The economic rewards during the period of exclusivity are the carrot.
The patent owner expends resources in expectation of receiving this reward.").
205. Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 ("Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowl-
edge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.").
206. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) ("But a patent is not a hunting license. It is
not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.").
207. Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(noting that setting a uniform federal standard of inventorship is necessary to achieve the patent
system's reward system goal).
208. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that sufficient detail must exist within the patent to demonstrate the invention to one of ordinary skill
in the arts).
209. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Ownership
springs from invention. The patent laws reward individuals for contributing to the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts. As part of that reward, an invention presumptively belongs to its creator."
(citation omitted)).
210. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 600, (Fed. Cir. 1985), modified on other
grounds, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
LIQUID PATENTS
right to exclude captures the idea into a legally enforceable ability to
preclude others from practicing the invention, recognizing that the idea
that is the subject matter of patents are, as with other intellectual prop-
erty, a non-rivalrous knowledge good.211 That is, the information can be
used by more than one party simultaneously. Because information can
be easily shared and copied, a patentable idea could be copied and used
by others. In economic terms, information is considered a "public
good., 212  Absent an enforceable patent right, the inventor's incentive
would be destroyed by others who would use the invention to compete
with the inventor. That is, because patent law requires inventors to pub-
licly disclose sufficient details about their invention to permit reproduc-
tion as a condition of patentability, a patented invention can be copied by
anyone willing to undertake that effort.2 13 Those who choose to copy do
not need to invest the time, money or risk that the initial inventor was
required to undertake. The public goods problem that the patent system
seeks to resolve is that, absent some form of legal protection, patents
might be used as templates for copyists who could reproduce the inven-
tion without the burden of the investment risk undertaken by the inven-
tor.2'4 The legal protection afforded by the patent system permits en-
forcement and compensation for infringement as a legal barrier against
free-riding and to protect the inventor based on the creation and disclo-
215sure of the invention.
The patent system acts to prevent a disadvantage to the inventor-
who may have expended significant costs for the invention and develop-
ment of a commercial application incorporating the invention-by a
competitor who copies the product and therefore has "a cost advantage
that may lead to a fall in the market price to a point at which the devel-
oper cannot recover his fixed costs."
216
211. Non-rivalrous goods may be consumed by multiple users without diminishing the quantity
or the utility of the good. In contrast, rivalrous goods are consumed as they are used and available
only to one user at a time. Some rivalrous goods cannot be used again, such as when a particular
apple is consumed. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Prop-
erty, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 37, 40 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property and Free
Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1050-51 (2005) (describing the non-rivalrous nature of information as
a public good).
212. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 131, at 14 (explaining that a "public good" in the
economic sense is that consumption by one person does not reduce its consumption by another).
213. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2006) (requiring patent applicants to disclose information that
enables one of ordinary skill in the art to reproduce the claimed invention); Lemley, supra note 108,
at 129 ("Because ideas are so easy to spread and so hard to control, only with difficulty may creators
recoup their investment in creating the idea. As a result, absent intellectual property protection, most
would prefer to copy rather than create ideas, and inefficiently few new ideas would be created.").
214. See Brett Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REv. 917, 947-48 (2005).
215. SCOTCHMER, supra note 132, at 34.
216. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 131, at 294.
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B. Analysis of Liquid Patent and Patent Incentives
1. Incentive to Invent
Transfer of a patent right is temporally disconnected from inven-
tion. Liquid patents holders are interested in maximizing profits by as-
serting patents against infringers for licensing revenues.21 7  Stated sim-
ply, the liquid patent holder's role takes place after invention has already
taken place.
At best, liquid patent holders provide services that assist inventors
in asserting their rights.218 One could analogize liquid patent entities as
supplemental to the inventive process as auction houses are to artistic
and creative works. Such entities facilitate a secondary market to maxi-
mize private wealth and are not themselves the primary drivers of inven-
tion. At present, the secondary market for patents is a nascent one. The
uncertain significance of this market, including the types and numbers of
patents that can be supported, may provide an insufficient incentive to
encourage investment in invention. The possibility of obtaining a finan-
cial reward in the market for liquid patents may not warrant the expense
and time of developing an incentive, unless a clearer path to that market
219exists.
To the extent that a liquid market for patents becomes viable, care
must be taken to avoid creating incentives to "invent" based on commer-
cialized products already developed by others through the application of
the novelty and non-obviousness standards, as well as through the appli-
cation of prosecution history estoppel.220
217. See, e.g., Lisa Lerer, Quick Draw, IP LAW & BUSINESS, July 20, 2006 (describing attorney
Raymond Niro's strategy of finding a buyer for a patent, then asserting the patent against forty
companies in order to obtain $65 million in licensing fees).
218. See Acacia Technology Group, Why Use Acacia?, http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/
whyuse.htm (print on file with author).
219. For example, Intellectual Ventures has filed 500 patent applications to date, and holds
invention sessions with scientists and engineers to generate ideas for patenting. See Press Release,
Intellectual Ventures, Intellectual Ventures Files 500th Patent Application (June 26, 2006) (print on
file with author), available at http://www.intellectualventures.com/docs/500apps.pdf. This organiza-
tion is developing its own strategy to create a secondary market for patents, thus providing a com-
paratively certain path to market for patents that issue from these applications. A certain market also
existed for the late Jerome H. Lemelson, who had been found to have "systematically extended the
pendency of his applications by sitting on his rights... while waiting for viable commercial systems
to be designed and marketed" and then "drafted and prosecuted hundreds of new claims in the late
1980's and 1990's specifically worded to cover those commercial systems." Symbol Techs., Inc. v.
Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., Ltd. P'ship, 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1156 (D. Nev. 2004),
aff'd, 422 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (invalidating Lemelson's patents). Because Lemelson's pat-
ents were based on an already-existing commercialized market, the path for obtaining revenue from
Lemelson's efforts at "invention" was certain.
220. See Symbol Techs., 301 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
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2. Incentive to Disclose
The patentability requirements include the inventor's obligation to
disclose the details of the invention. 22' An inventor must include a writ-
ten specification that describes the invention and tells the public how to
make and use the invention.222 In return, a patent applicant forgoes the
potentially lengthier trade secret protection and the public gains the in-
ventor's knowledge reproduced in the patent.223 Thus, meaningful de-
scription of the invention and its underlying technical information is part
of the quidpro quo of the patentee's grant of the right to exclude 224 "in
the hope that, among other things, the disclosure of all inventions will
add to the sum total of knowledge available to the general public.2 25
Including sufficient details about the invention permits members of the
226public to make and use the invention after the patent's expiration.
As with invention, post-patent application transfers of the patent
right are temporally disconnected from the inventor's decision to file a
patent application. Non-commercializing inventors are likely to pursue
patenting and the required disclosure. This is because non-
commercializing inventors that seek to license are unlikely to be con-
cerned about maintaining their inventions as trade secrets, as trade se-
crets are much more difficult to license compared to patent protection. 227
Commercializing inventors will be unlikely to liquidize their patents, so
long as they continue to commercialize the product made under the pat-
ent. Thus, the likelihood that the availability of a system of liquid pat-
ents will assist the disclosure policy of the patent laws is not significant.
Over time, patenting practices may increase if a stable asset market
for patents emerges. If more patents are filed as the potential for profit
becomes more readily realizable, the disclosure of more technical infor-
mation may occur. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, however, "in
light of the highly developed art of drafting patent claims so that they
disclose as little useful information as possible-while broadening the
221. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2006) states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to en-
able any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly con-
nected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.; see also Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
222. Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
223. See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in
their Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 238 n.95 (2006).
224. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
225. Litton Systems, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 145 F.3d 1472, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Gajarsa, J.,
dissenting).
226. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
227. Heald, supra note 107, at 482.
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scope of the claim as widely as possible-the argument based upon the
virtue of disclosure must be warily evaluated.
228
i. Commercialization
Commercialization has been called "the fundamental purpose" 229 of
the patent system, and is intended to encourage public benefits in the
form of available commercial products and the private rewards generated
in the sale or licensing of the patent. In the 1974 case Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp.,23° the U.S. Supreme Court explained the reward incen-
tive in terms of the need to use the patent system to develop, commer-
cialize and sell products that derive from the inventions:
The patent laws promote this progress by offering a right of exclu-
sion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often
enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development. The
productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on soci-
ety through the introduction of new products and processes of manu-
facture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased• . 231
employment and better lives for our citizens.
Commercialization of the ideas embodied in patents has been ar-
gued to provide significant social benefits that outweigh costs that the
patent system imposes on society.232 By way of example, innovative
products and cost reductions that flow from research and development
have been argued to be "quite remarkable," and to outweigh the eco-
nomic loss that society pays in licensing rates and other rents.233 One
Federal Circuit jurist has explained that the court has allowed patent law
to be "placed in the perspective of the marketplace: the destination con-
templated in the Constitution. '234
The importance of commercialization as an incentive to the patent
system was thoroughly discussed at the time of the 1952 amendments to
the patent laws and the writings of a significant proponent and co-author
228. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.
229. See Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d at 599; see also, Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722
F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Another policy of the system is to stimulate the investment of
risk capital in the commercialization of useful patentable inventions so that the public gets some
benefit from them, which may not occur in the absence of some patent protection.").
230. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
231. Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480.
232. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
252 (1994) (explaining that innovation "leads directly to consumer benefits in the form of new
products and lower prices"). The expansion of output and the reduction in price achieved through
technological progress resulting from research and development may be quite remarkable, far be-
yond any possible social loss from rent seeking.
233. Id. (citing Andrew S. Rappaport & Shmuel Halevi, The Computerless Computer Com-
pany, 7/1/91 HARV. BUS. REV. 69, 70 (finding the price of computers measured in millions of in-
structions per second fell from about $250,000 in 1980 to less than $2,500 in 1990).
234. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 123, at 687.
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of those amendments, Giles Rich. 235 In a five-part essay that described
the tension between the patent system and antitrust law, Rich placed the
greatest emphasis on the last of these as "by far the greatest in practical
importance" as "responsible for the actual delivery of the invention into
the hands of the public. 236
Rich's article quoted Conway P. Coe, then-Commissioner of Pat-
ents, emphasizing that, "[a]n inventor will not be rewarded and society
will not be benefited until the invention passes into commercial chan-
nels., 237 Coe likened the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to "sort of a
national suggestion box" which others could use to further innovation.
238
Critically, Rich recognized that many patents which had been submitted
to this "national suggestion box" had never and would never be ex-
ploited, and opined that these "unused potential rights to exclude ... do
not adversely affect the public. ' 239 However, liquid patent holders have
disturbed Rich's calculus that unused patents impose no social costs.
240
This is because holders of liquid patents have taken the unused patents
out of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's so-called "suggestion
box 241 to seek royalties on those engaged in commercialization.
242
Liquid patents contradict the commercialization goal of patent law,
because such patents are expressly not commercialized. Rather, such
patents are used to generate revenue without undertaking the risks that
innovation, commercialization and marketing would require.
Generally, economists assume that those willing to be exposed to
increased risk might be expected to earn higher returns than if they had
less exposure to risk.243 Applying this rule to patent principles, however,
liquid patents provide inventors with the option of declining to avoid the
risks of commercialization and instead sell their patents to a liquid patent
holder for a specific and certain sum. Liquid patent holders have the lux-
ury of holding onto the patent right until an appropriate and perhaps in-
nocent commercializing infringer emerges. This raises the potential for
waste, as the commercializing infringer independently develops the in-
vention and incorporates the design into a product. In this scenario, all
235. Kieff, supra note 95, at 741.
236. Id. at 741-42 (citing Rich, supra note 164, at 133-34).




241. Id. (quoting then-U.S. Patent and Trademark Commissioner Coe).
242. According to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, patentees abandon patents by failing
to pay maintenance fees. Specifically, 20% of patentees abandon their patents by failing to pay their
first maintenance fee at 3.5 years, 43% abandon by failing to pay at 7.5 years, and 75% abandon at
11.5 years. See United States Patent and Trademark Office Questions and Answers Regarding the
GATT Uruguay Round and NAFTA Changes to U.S. Patent Law and Practice (Feb. 1995), avail-
able at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/uruguay/QA.html.
243. See Economics A-Z, THE ECONOMIST.COM, http://www.economist.com/research/
Economics/alphabetic.cfm?LETTER=R#RISK (defining "risk") (print on file with author).
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the risk of commercialization is on the infringer. Further, liquid patents
are likely to encourage the anticommons problem244 by creating a poten-
tially lucrative market for patents that are not commercialized into prod-
ucts for use by the public. That is, given the choice an inventor may sell
the patent to a liquid patent holder rather than brave the market by creat-
ing a product. The patent system has allowed a right to be created with-
out the corresponding social benefit that encourages the inventor to inno-
vation and commercialize based on the original idea. Moreover, the op-
portunity to generate more ideas in the process of innovation (such as the
better means of manufacture) or during commercialization (for example,
improvements to the original idea based on customer feedback) are lost.
The courts' view of the reward system as a means to assist firms in
invention and ultimately in taking steps toward commercialization has
created an anomaly in the discussion of the goals of the patent system.
Although the courts long ago recognized that as a policy matter the pub-
lic was intended to benefit from products created by the patent owner's
commercial exploitation of invention,245 more recently courts have made
clear that the strength and existence of the patent right is unaffected
where the owner decides not to commercialize or license the invention.246
Thus, the rule of patent law is that the existence of the patent right is
entirely separate from those considerations-stated simply, one does not
have to practice or license the patent as a condition of patentability.247
As a consequence, the problem of liquid patents sits squarely be-
tween the fundamental policy of reward theory and the rule of law. That
is, reward policy favors implementation of the claimed invention, but
patent law rules do not require incorporation of the patented idea into any
product or service. Liquid patents seek the full level of protection that
the patent system can provide despite their failure to contribute to the
commercialization goal of the patent system.
244. The anticommons problem occurs where multiple early patent owners restrict develop-
ment for later innovators. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, Ill HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). This results in inefficient
pricing. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 187, at 729 ("If a product must include components A and
B, and A and B are each covered by patents that grant different companies monopoly control over
the components, each company will charge a monopoly price for its component. As a result, the
price of the integrated product will be inefficiently high-and output inefficiently low-because it
reflects an attempt to charge two different monopoly prices."). Further, if a single patentee of a key
component refuses to license, all subsequent innovation relying on that component may be impossi-
ble.
245. See Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 327-28 (1859).
246. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 213-14 (1980); Cont'l Paper Bag
Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1908).
247. See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995). When
invoking this rule, Rite-Hite invoked the disclosure policy without crediting the commercialization
policy. Id. ("A patent is granted in exchange for a patentee's disclosure of an invention, not for the
patentee's use of the invention.").
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C. Ex Ante Justifications for the Patent System: Kitch's Prospect Theory
A further goal of the patent system is outlined in a prominent 1977
article by Edmund Kitch describing his "prospect theory" of patents. 48
In that article, Kitch describes certain ex post justifications for the patent
system. 249 Liquid patents operate ex post, that is, such transfers and re-
lated assertions occur after the patent has issued. Thus, an examination
of how liquid patents fare under Kitch's theory may be helpful in deter-
mining where liquid patents fit within the current theoretical framework
of the ex post use of patents.
1. Kitch's Prospect Theory
Analogizing patents to the mining claim system for public lands in
the developing American West in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, Kitch theorizes that the patent system confers socially beneficial
activity after a patent right is created. 250  Kitch's prospect theory is
grounded on the patent system's award of exclusive and publicly re-
corded rights to first inventors who seek to develop a particular technol-
ogy solution-typically, one who seeks the status of a pioneer in a par-
251 te~ticular field. Just as the former mineral claim system created incen-
tives "for prospectors to pack their burros and walk off in the desert in
search of mineralization," Kitch believed that the patent system could
allow pioneering inventors to control the development of their field of
technology as an ex post reward for obtaining the patent right.
252
Kitch argued that once a patent is granted, the public disclosure of
the patent's issuance signals rivals to stop duplicative innovative activity
for that technological field.253 According to the prospect theory, this cir-
cumstance puts the first inventor in the exclusive position to efficiently
coordinate resources to enhance the patent's value.254 Under this theory,
patent exclusivity provides an incentive to invent first to capture the pat-
ent, and prevents the waste of resources that would otherwise result if
competing inventors continue duplicative inventive activity.
Kitch's theory makes a clean separation between the inventions
which appear in patent claims, and the later commercial embodiments
which typically require additional research, refinement and optimiza-
248. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
266 (1977).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 271,274.
251. Id. at 266.
252. See id. at 274, 276.
253. Id. at 278. As Kitch explains, "[n]o one is likely to make significant investments search-
ing for ways to increase the commercial value of a patent unless he has made previous arrangements
with the owner of the patent." Id. at 276.
254. Id. at 276.
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tion.255 Further to this same point, Kitch argued that the patents encour-
age their owners to undertake the investment necessary to finalize and
manufacture a commercial product based on the patent prospect without
concerns about the competitive disadvantages that might be created, such
as where a patent owner expends resources to promote consumer demand
for a product in a manner that might benefit others firms within the same
market.256 Kitch's prospect theory also recognizes a patent owner's in-
centive to seek licenses before the patent issues, based on the likelihood
that the patent will issue.257 Indeed, Kitch proposes that patent licenses
could be used to prevent wasteful duplication of innovative activity by
allowing the patent holder to seek agreements that preclude competitors
from designing around the patent owner's invention.258
At its core, Kitch's prospect theory argues in favor of early, broad
grants of patent protection to a single inventor. In Kitch's world, the
public grant to a single pioneer prevents wasteful duplicative technologi-
cal investigation by others, because a publicly disclosed patent grant
signals others that a winner has been declared. As one commentator has
noted, "[b]ecause the right to innovate is a common right (it is not under
exclusive contTol of any one firm), competition among firms will lead to
inefficient races to invent that can dissipate any social surplus associated
with an invention. ', 259 The prospect theory holds that permitting a broad
patent granted in the early stages of an innovative activity prevents this
inefficiency as a disincentive to perform wastefully duplicative re-
search.26°
2. Application of the Prospect Theory to Liquid Patents
Although Kitch's prospect theory has been subject to criticism,
261
Kitch argued that "the prospect function is a significant, if not predomi-
nant, function of the American patent system as it has operated in
fact.,, 26 2 Yet Kitch's prospect theory as proposed does not address how
the patent system operates in situations where the invention as embodied
in a patent is created to be transferred or sold to another.263 The theory
focuses on ex post incentives that are intended to drive the inventor's
initial decision to engage in innovative activity as well as the prevention
255. Id. at 271 ("Many inventions, including many important ones, are patented in a commer-
cially significant form, yet the patented form is trivial in significance as compared to the later de-
rived and improved versions.").
256. Id. at 277.
257. Id. at 278 ("[T]he patent gives [the] owner an affirmative incentive to seek out firms and
inform them of the new technology, even before issuance, if the most efficient and hence patent-
value-optimizing way to exploit the invention is to license it.").
258. Id. at 279.
259. John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHi. L. REV. 439, 440
(2004).
260. Id. at 444.
261. See id. at 442-43 (recognizing scholarly criticism of Kitch's prospect theory).
262. Kitch, supra note 248, at 267.
263. See, e.g., id. at 269 (examining priority rules).
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of socially wasteful activity in the commercial market by non-
inventors.264
It might be argued that liquid patents are entirely consistent with
Kitch's theory, which hypothesizes that the patent system puts "the pat-
ent owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological and
market enhancement of the patent's value so that duplicative investments
are not made and so that information is exchanged among the search-
ers." 265 Liquid patents may be argued to carry out the view that patent
transfers permit a patent's maximum value and potential exploitation.
266
There are several problems with this argument that demonstrate that
the prospect theory fails to account for liquid patents. As an initial mat-
ter, the patentee's right of control-using the term "control" in the same
sense as Kitch described as continuing to invent and commercialize
around the original grant--ends with the patent's transfer of ownership
to another. Kitch's fundamental assumption that a single inventor/owner
has an incentive to mine the innovative activity that led to the patent
grant simply disappears when the patent is sold.
Although it is possible that liquid patents can be used in a manner
consistent with the rewards that Kitch identified by permitting transfer-
ability to an entity which is better positioned to market the benefits of the
patent in the most economically and socially desirable manner possible,
nothing in the patent law requires or even encourages a patentee to do
SO. 2 6 7 Liquid patents can be readily sold to a licensing entity which adds
the patent to its portfolio in the hopes of using the patent to generate li-
censing revenue, without any further incentive to invent or innovate
around the original patent. That is, Kitch's interest rewarding patentees
as prospectors is not backed by any patent rules that provide the benefits
of commercialization of the products incorporating the patented inven-
tion. This is because the strength of the patent does not depend on
whether or how a patentee seeks to reap the benefits of the right in a
commercialized product.2 68 Further, nothing in patent laws requires that
264. Id. at 266 (noting the patent system's ability to achieve efficiency in the development and
management of technological prospects "by awarding exclusive and publicly recorded ownership of
a prospect shortly after its discovery").
265. Id. at 276. Burk and Lemley point out that Kitch's Prospect Theory operates in this re-
spect as classic Coasean bargaining. Burk & Lemley, supra note 187, at 725 ("This is the Coase
theorem at work. Under that theory, giving one party the power to control and orchestrate all subse-
quent use and research relating to the patented technology should result in efficient licensing, both to
end users and to potential improvers .. "); see, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960) (setting forth the Coase theorem).
266. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 2655, 2656 (1994) (describing the Coase Theorem as a system of allocating rights
which permits transfer of rights to permit their highest-value use through private bargains).
267. See, e.g., Bement v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90-92 (1902) ("[T]he general rule is
absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United States."); United
States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
268. See, e.g., Cont'1 Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 424-25.
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a patent transfer be socially beneficial, economically efficient or allow
for public access to the benefits of the invention.
Fundamentally, Kitch's theory envisions an inventor who under-
takes efforts to manage resources, such as manufacturing, raising con-
sumer interest in the product and resources necessary to finalize a com-
mercial embodiment based on the patented invention, to maximize a pat-
ent's value. 269 The benefits that flow from single stewardship of a broad
patent granted early in the life of a patent do not necessarily flow where
the patentee relinquishes that benefit to an entity engaged in licensing as
a revenue generation model.270 The subsequent sale of the patent to an
entity that does not itself engage in innovative activity is entirely attenu-
ated from a patent system designed-to use Kitch's analogy-"for pros-
pectors to pack their burros and walk off in the desert in search of miner-
alization." 271 Kitch's prospect theory does not stretch far enough to jus-
tify the full range of rights afforded to those who purchase patents at an
open market.
D. Summary ofLiquid Patents and the Relation to Patent Theory
Liquid patents are geared to take financial advantage of rules that
have stabilized and maximized patent protection in order to serve the
overarching goals of innovation. Yet liquid patents do not serve-and in
some cases act in contravention to-the policies developed by the courts
and in the legal scholarship. While these rules may serve the goals of the
patent system well in most instances, their application to permit profit-
taking from using patents as assets is not supportable.
Patents raise the opportunity for strategic behavior 27 2 that does not
always maximize social access to the fruits of inventive activity. An
entity that seeks to license patents is interested in maximizing negotiating
leverage against those who are commercializing products in order to ob-
tain the maximum amount of licensing fees or damages in a lawsuit.
Some of this behavior can adversely affect innovation by seeking to
"tax" subsequent innovation with license fees that exceed an objective
market licensing rate for the patent.273 Moreover, liquid patent holders
can use their patents to threaten or even prevent entire areas of research
while attempting to maximize their negotiating position.
269. See Kitch, supra note 248, at 276 (theorizing that ex ante benefit of a patent is that the
right "puts the patent owner in a position to coordinate the search for technological and market
enhancement of the patent's value").
270. This circumstance might occur where a patent is purchased solely to "hold up" one's
competitors or seeks to use the patent only to raise money through licensing revenue.
271. See Kitch, supra note 248, at 274.
272. See Merges, supra note 266, at 2659.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 32-46.
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To the extent that patents are viewed as a system of regulation,274
the patent laws have not attempted to regulate liquid patent holders' stra-
tegic behavior. The disposition of post-grant patent rights are considered
private rights which can be freely used to further the owner's-and not
the public's-interest. 275 Although in formation the patent right is fun-
damentally intended to benefit the public, post-grant uses of patents are
generally deemed to be essentially free of regulation even when those
rights are used in contravention to the public interest.
Proposed changes that would specifically target liquid patents con-
flict with the goal of uniformity that pervades the patent system. The
patent as an immutable right has been entrenched in the U.S. patent sys-
tem for the past two hundred years, and this circumstance has not been
interfered with lightly. Modifications to the patentability standards or
the ability to transfer patent rights create the possibility of interfering
with favorable goals.
The patent laws currently consider the patentee's status primarily in
determining remedies for patent infringement. A proposal that focuses
on the remedies aspect of the patent statutes is therefore most consistent
with the current structure of the patent system as a set of uniform rules.
As liquid patent holders are primarily interested in maximizing licensing
rates, a proposal for change that affects remedies may have the greatest
potential effect on patent holders' negotiating conduct.276 Moreover,
limiting the immunities that patent holders obtain under tort theories,
such as the antitrust law, may serve to curb abuses of the patent system
that are currently insulated from liability.
V. A PROPOSAL: USING PATENT REMEDIES AS A SOLUTION
A. Injunctive Relief
Before the recent case of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L. C.277 was
decided, as a general rule, a district court would issue a permanent in-
junction in patent cases that prohibited the future manufacture, import
and sale of an infringing device after a judgment of infringement had
been entered. 278 At that time, the Federal Circuit noted that "courts have
in rare instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in
274. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Patents and The Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bar-
gain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1317 (2004).
275. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 108, at 149 ("Individual companies are neither omniscient,
pure-hearted, nor necessarily rational. Indeed, at best, they are out to line their pockets with as much
money as they can find. No less a capitalist than Adam Smith warned us not to expect individual
private companies to behave in the public interest.").
276. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950-52 (1979) (arguing that parties reach agreements in private
ordering based on considerations on the alternatives that adjudication would likely award).
277. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
278. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S.
Ct. 1837 (2006).
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order to protect the public interest. ''279 A case had to be "sufficiently
exceptional" to the degree that, as a practical matter, the discretion to
deny injunctive relief was very rarely exercised.280
The general rule favoring injunctive relief was reversed in eBay Inc.
v. MercExchange L.L.C.281 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a patentee must satisfy the traditional test before a court would exer-
cise its power to grant permanent injunctive relief.28 2 In order to obtain a
permanent injunction, the patentee must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies avail-
able at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate
for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunc-
tion.
2 83
By requiring courts to meaningfully apply this four-factor test, the
eBay court severed the patent right to exclude from the previously held
law that permanent injunctions nearly always and almost inevitably fol-
lowed a judgment of infringement.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in the eBay case agreed that
the well-established, four-factor test must be used to determine whether a
permanent injunction should be granted against a defendant who has
been found to have infringed a valid patent.284 Justice Kennedy's con-
currence proposed that the historic outcome that injunctive relief should
be granted may be different now that "[a]n industry has developed in
which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees., 285 Justice Kennedy
recognized that in those circumstances the patent "can be employed as a
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent., 28 6 Although Justice Kennedy singled out
licensing entities as a potentially inappropriate case for permanent in-
junctive relief, Justice Kennedy's opinion expressly rejected that such
determinations should turn on "categorical rules. 287 Thus, Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion appears to reject any notion that all non-commercializing
patentees be barred from permanent injunctive relief.
279. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc, 56 F.3d at 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
280. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
281. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
282. Id. at 1839.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
285. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
286. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
287. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The eBay case presents an opportunity to solve part of the problem
that liquid patents create-that is, the hold up problem that can prevent
the implementation of subsequent invention and commercialization by
others. Justice Kennedy's concurrence should be adopted as an instruc-
tive example of how the majority opinion can be applied to liquid pat-
ents. As a practical matter, many liquid patent holders may have diffi-
culty establishing a right to permanent injunctive relief now that eBay
has shifted the legal standard. Primarily, liquid patent holders may have
difficulty demonstrating irreparable harm, a critical element of the four-
part test adopted by the eBay court.
Generally, irreparable harm is defined as an injury that cannot be
compensated by monetary damages.288 Violation of the patent right
alone is not irreparable harm, at least in the manner in which courts have
defined that term in determining motions for preliminary injunctions.289
Companies can show irreparable harm by demonstrating an inability to
calculate their injury by demonstrating, for example, a harmful impact to
goodwill, erosion of a customer base or the diminishment of a competi-
tive position in the marketplace. 290 Liquid patent holders who do not sell
product cannot establish any irreparable harm relevant to their competi-
tive market position or lost customer base, because such companies have
no market or customer base to protect. As the Federal Circuit has ac-
knowledged in the context of considering preliminary injunctive relief,
"[a]lthough a patentee's failure to practice an invention does not neces-
sarily defeat the patentee's claim of irreparable harm, the lack of com-
mercial activity by the patentee is a significant factor in the calculus., 29'
The remaining three factors of the eBay four-factor test are more
fact-dependent and therefore the result may vary depending on the liquid
patent holder's conduct. For example, a liquid patent holder's willing-
ness to license has been viewed to demonstrate that an adequate remedy
at law exists.292 As for the balance of the parties' hardships, an infring-
ing product that brings significant public benefits may be found to out-
weigh a non-producing patentee's interest in enforcement through in-
junction.293 Similarly, if a liquid patent holder can be made whole with
288. See, e.g., Dominion Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1257-58
(I0th Cir. 2004).
289. Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (rejecting argu-
ment that harm to the patent right to exclude constitutes irreparable harm); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v.
Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("Application of a concept that every patentee is
always irreparably harmed by an alleged infringer's pretrial sales would . . . disserve the patent
system." (emphasis omitted)).
290. Dominion, 356 F.3d at 1261.
291. High Tech Med. Instruments v. New Image Indus. Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
292. T.i. Smith & Nephew Ltd. v. Consolid. Med. Equip., Inc., 821 F.2d 646, 648 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (licensing is "incompatible with the emphasis on the right to exclude that is the basis for the
presumption" of irreparable harm).
293. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 714 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("[lI]n
a case such as this, the public does not benefit from a patentee who obtains a patent yet declines to
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licensing fees awarded in the form of monetary relief, a court may be
reluctant to hold that the balance of hardships warrants an injunction.
As for the public interest factor, courts are generally reluctant to as-
sist a defendant who has been adjudged an infringer. This is because the
public interest is generally considered to favor relief for those whose
valid patent rights have been violated, and an injunction might be viewed
as integral to the reward theory's encouragement of invention and disclo-
sure. However, a patentee who does not make or sell any product cannot
establish that the patent system's interests have been served.
eBay's requirement for an individualized assessment of the parties'
positions will necessarily ask courts to examine the liquid patent holder's
position in relation to the patent system and the public, both as a general
matter and within the specific factual circumstances of the case. Liquid
patent holders are likely to encounter significant impediments to perma-
nent injunctive relief. If Justice Kennedy's guidance is adopted in the
lower court's application of the eBay case, liquid patent holders will not
have the threat of injunction as a negotiation tool.
B. Monetary Remedies
1. Background: Money Damages Under the Patent Act
According to the patent statute, "[u]pon finding for the claimant the
court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement .... A key term in the statutory language is "compen-
sate., 295 Section 284 was enacted to "ensure that the patent owner would
in fact receive full compensation for 'any damages' he suffered as a re-
sult of the infringement.,
296
Monetary compensation includes the patentee's lost profits, a rea-
sonable royalty, or a combination of both. A patentee can establish re-
covery for lost profits by demonstrating that the infringing products or
services resulted in the patentee's loss of earnings.297 The fundamental
allow the public to benefit from the inventions contained therein."), rev'd, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
294. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 2006).
295. Id.
296. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1983). A patentee may also *
seek damages for infringement for up to three times the damages award. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284; see,
e.g., Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Serv. Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In addi-
tion, a patentee obtains attorney fees, prejudgment interest and costs under certain circumstances. 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 284, 285 (West 2006).
297. Typically, patentees demonstrate lost profits by relying on the test in Panduit Corp. v.
Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978). To meet the Panduit test, "a patent
owner must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing
substitutes, (3) [its] manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the
detailed profit he would have made." Id. at 1156. A patentee does not need to demonstrate these
factors with absolute certainty, but rather a reasonable probability that such sales would have been
made absent infringement. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545. Polaroid's burden of proof on the lost profits
is not absolute, but one of "reasonable probability." Id. To obtain lost profits, a patentee does not
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question for determining whether a patentee can obtain lost profits is
whether the patentee can demonstrate with reasonable probability that,
but for the infringement, the patentee would have made the sales that
were made by the infringer.
298
As liquid patent holders do not sell product, the more realistic
means of recovery is a reasonable royalty, which also derives from sec-
tion 284. This section explains that "[u]pon finding for the claimant the
court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer .... " 299 Typically, a patentee who
has never commercialized a product will be in a poor position to demon-
strate lost profits.300 This provision was enacted to "ensure that 1,.. pat-
ent holder would in fact receive full compensation for 'any damages' he
suffered as a result of the infringement., 30  The inquiry to find reason-
able royalty consists of two steps: 1) determination of a reasonable com-
pensation base, i.e., the total value of the infringing items on which the
patentee is entitled to royalty payments; and 2) determination of a rea-
sonable royalty rate to apply to that compensation base.302
To determine the royalty rate, courts consider evidence from a
number of sources. These include a fifteen-factor test from the Georgia
Pacific case, otherwise known as the Georgia Pacific factors.30 3  The
most salient portions of the Georgia Pacific test are the prior license
rates obtained by the licensee, the commercial relationship between the
patentee and the infringer, and the market rate for the patented invention
that the parties would have reached if a rate had been negotiated between
them.304 All factors do not need to be considered in every case, but rather
fact finders have discretion to consider those that the court deems most
relevant. 30 5 Generally, a very important factor in this inquiry is the hypo-
need to prove that the patentee's product incorporates the asserted patent, so long as the patentee's
product competes with the infringing product. Id. at 1548-49.
298. Id. at 1545.
299. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (emphasis added).
300. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1548 ("Normally, if the patentee is not selling a product, by defini-
tion there can be no lost profits."). But see King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 944
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a patent holder who did not practice the patent could recover lost
profits where both parties marketed competing tape loading machines that that court found sufficient
related to the patented technology for tape reel changing assembly). Specifically, the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court finding that the patentee would have made sales of the patentee's machine
absent infringement by the defendant. Id. at 953.
301. Devex, 461 U.S. at 654-55.
302. See generally Gargoyles, Inc. v. United States, 113 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(affirming trial court's use of royalty rate multiplied by a royalty base).
303. See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co., v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The test
derives from Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
304. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
305. TWM Mfg. Co., 789 F.2d at 899 (affirming reasonable royalty and rejecting the argument
that the calculation method was flawed due to the special master's determination not to analyze all of
the Georgia Pacific factors).
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thetically negotiated rate between the parties.3 °6 Despite the fact that the
fundamental purpose of patent damages is compensation for the patentee,
the reasonable royalty test contains no linguistic tether to the patentee's
actual harm.
2. Disparities between Patent Value and the Value of a Liquid Pat-
ent
a. The Problem of Using Patent Purchase Prices In Litigation
One misconception that relates to liquid patents is whether price
paid for the patent equates to the liquid patent holder's damages. This
error fails to appreciate the theoretical distinction between the two. Pat-
ent damages represent compensation for harm suffered by the patentee
for the infringer's use of the invention in a particular product, process or
method.3 °7 Because patent damages have a causative requirement, re-
covery for patent infringement is necessarily the specific harm from the
use of a particular patent in a particular infringing device.3 8 That is, the
right to recover for patent infringement measures the right of the patent
holder to recover as against one particular party, the infringer, as that
patent is being used in the infringer's products. 30 9 By contrast, market
prices represent an amount paid for an entire patent right separate and
apart from the context of actual use.
This issue becomes significant because liquid patent purchasers
who seek to exploit patents as commodities may base the potential value
of the patent on licensing expectations drawn from anticipated jury
awards. A court's acceptance of the purchaser's assumptions of the pat-
ent's value as correlative of an appropriate liability amount would both
usurp the jury's role and create an unfortunate echo effect of the buyer's
expectations of a patent's value influencing the measure of their own
306. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1554.
307. Id. In this case, the Federal Circuit explained the modem formulation of compensation
under the patent statute. The Rite-Hite court emphasized that compensation for harm to the patentee
was the fundamental purpose of the patent damages statute. Id. at 1544-45. The court found that
damages required a causative relation between the infringement and the patentee's harm. See Paul
E. Strand, Back to Bedrock: Constitutional Underpinnings Set "New" Standards for Patent In-
fringement Causation, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 375,392 (2002).
308. See Riles v. Shell Explor. & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TWMMfg.
Co., 789 F.2d at 901 (calculating damages separately based on the particular point in time at which
the infringing act occurred). This rule has been expanded by the Federal Circuit's reading of the
entire market value rule, as well as the court's willingness to permit recovery for bundled and con-
voyed sales into the base figure of a reasonable royalty award for damages. Amy L. Landers, Let the
Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 307, 356-62 (2006); see also Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
309. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964). Patent
holders can recovery only nominal damages if the infringer's use causes no actual harm to the pat-
entee. Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 510.
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harm. This result interferes with the objective standards by which liabil-
310ity rules operate.
Further, a patent purchaser's expectations of value may not reflect
the patent's actual market value. For example, patents obtained at a liq-
uidation bankruptcy or from a distressed company may have prices that
fail to represent the full potential value of the invention.31  A bankruptcy
trustee or individual responsible for the transfer may not have sufficient
experience with technology assets or sufficient contacts to maximize the
asset's value.
31 2
The price paid for a liquid patent may be of limited usefulness in a
damages award, as the circumstances of the patent's acquisition and ul-
timate use of the patented invention play an important role. 313 The pur-
pose of providing compensation for the patentee's harm may not be
served with reference to the price paid by the liquid patent holder.
b. The Problem of Using Patent Auction Pricing in Litigation
Just as there are misconceptions surrounding the effect of a patent's
purchase price on monetary damages, patent auctions have been errone-
ously argued to represent an objective measure of a liquid patent's li-
censing value:
In an auction, the determination of the fair price of the patent will not
be the blind man's bluff exercise that often characterizes two-party
negotiations, where neither party knows exactly what the other side is
willing to accept and where both therefore risk either overpaying or
underselling. In an open auction, the true value of the patent can be
measured by the interest of multiple buyers. The seller can gauge the
market value of his patent in the bidding process and the buyers can
gauge the behavior of rival buyers.
314
An examination of these assumptions demonstrates that the dynam-
ics of auctions do not deliver the same results as a negotiated royalty.
This issue is significant because the patent holder may seek to pin the
310. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 88, at 1107-08 (noting that liability awards are based on
objective measures and that "there is no reason to believe that a market, a decentralized system of
valuing, will cause people to express their true valuations and hence yield results which all would in
fact agree are desirable").
311. David E. Leta & James H. Jones, Valuing Intangible Assets in Bankruptcy Cases, 18
UTAH 133. 22, 22 (2005) ("In general, an intangible asset will have the highest value when it is being
used in the business that created the asset, rather than when it is being sold apart from that busi-
ness.").
312. Ronald J. Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation Choices of Failed High Tech
Firms, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1375, 1390-92 (2004).
313. See, e.g., Integra Life. I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(amended December 3, 2003), revd on other grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (recognizing that where
the purchase price of an entire company was $20,000,000, "[a] $15,000,000 award figure to com-
pensate for infringement of only some of [the patent owner's] patents before [the] acquisition seems
unbalanced in view of the overall acquisition price").
314. Evans & Dolin, supra note 51.
20061
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 84:1
patent's actual value to the auction price. Secondly, the patentee may
attempt to license the patent based on the price paid at auction. Further,
the liquid patent holder may argue that the auction price represents a
significant figure for purpose of setting a damage award. However, there
are a number of reasons why an auction price varies from each of these.
For example, the number of bidding parties at auction influences
price, while bargaining power tends to be more significant in a two-party
negotiation. 315 Competition among a number of bidders tends to drive
prices higher at auctions when compared with prices resulting from two-
316party negotiations. Moreover, it has been recognized that an auction
winner is not the bidder who paid market value but rather the bidder with
the highest estimated value for common value items, a phenomenon
known as the "winner's curse. 317 This factor is difficult to quantify, as
the price differential associated with the winner's curse varies with the
structure of the auction and the sophistication of the bidder.
318
The auction value paid may also vary due to an individual bidder's
circumstances, such as his or her ability to learn from the information
disclosed during an open auction, and the bidder's attitudes toward tak-
ing risks more generally. 319 Research on the effect of emotions on bid-
ding behavior is in a nascent stage, one recent study has introduced the
emotional state of the bidder as another factor that affects bidding behav-
ior.320  This study was based on a controlled experiment found that bid-
315. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180,
180 (1996) (study analyzing auctions for the sale of a company).
316. See Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 19 (1989).
[W]hen a seller employs an English auction to sell an item worth $100 to himself to a
pair of potential buyers with reservation values of $170 and $200, the equilibrium theory
suggests that the sale will occur at $170. Not only is the result efficient, but the seller
gets a good price: By bargaining singly with the $200 evaluator, the seller can at best
hope to split the gains, getting a price at $150 ....
Id. (citation omitted).
317. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50
ECONOMETRICA 1089, 1094 (1982). Most literature finds that the winner's curse does not exist for
purely private value auctions, because bidder evaluations for such auctions are inherently individual-
ized and therefore it cannot be said that one overpaid relative to an objective price. See, e.g., Robert
C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder Collusion and Antitrust Law: Refining the Analysis of
Price Fixing to Account for the Special Features of Auction Markets, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 83, 95
(2004).
318. Dan Levin, et. al., Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value
Auctions, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 442, 442-43 (1996); see also Marshall & Meurer, supra note 317, at
95 ("A sophisticated bidder avoids the winner's curse by recognizing that winning means all other
bidders received less favorable signals, so she should adjust her expected valuation and bid accord-
ingly.").
319. See John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common
Value Auctions, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 894, 912 (1986) (noting that some bidders who adopted more
aggressive bidding strategies were more successful than others, suggesting that bidders' attitudes
toward risk and individual abilities toward processing information were important to auction out-
comes).
320. Ronald Bosman & Amo Riedl, Emotions and Economic Shocks in a First-Price Auction:
An Experimental Study, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 2003-056, 1 (May 2003), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=417660.
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ders who were in a negative emotional state tended to increase their bid
amounts.32  The authors concluded, "emotions influence behavior of
economic agents in a non-trivial way, even in competitive environments
[such] as first-price auctions. 322
Prices obtained at an auction may vary from the market price for
other reasons, including either explicit or implicit collusion among bid-
ders or predatory behavior.32 3 One famous example involves the auction
of ten blocks of spectrum sold by Germany in 1999,324 where two parties
used signals embedded in bid amounts to divide a market between
them.325 Such collusion may be difficult to detect, as an auction seller
may not wish to police collusion by eliminating bidders because seller
may be in a better position by keeping more bidders in the auction even
if a depressed price is expected to result from the collusive activity. 326
Thus, the effect of collusion may cause an effect on the patent price that
makes calibration to the patent's actual licensing value difficult to meas-
ure.
Prices set at auction may vary significantly for a number of reasons
unrelated to an objective market measure of the good that is the subject
of the auction, or as measured by a negotiated rate between the parties.
The statement that "the true value of the patent can be measured by the
interest of multiple buyers, 327 fails to consider the full complexity that
underlies auction pricing.
3. Compensation for Patent Infringement: Innovating Patentees
and Liquid Patent Holders
One reason that the damages calculation presents an appropriate
place for proposed changes is that damages focus precisely on the pat-
entee. Proposed changes to the damages rules are also appropriate be-
cause some of the potential for harm to invention and innovation concern
321. Id. at 17.
322. Id. at 18.
323. Paul Klemperer, Collusion and Predation in Auction Markets 1 (February 2001 draft),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-260188.
324. Id. at 2-3.
325. Id. In that instance, Germany set a rule that new bids on a block of spectrum had to exceed
the previous high bid by at least 10 percent. Id. One company, Mannesman, submitted a high first
bid on blocks 1-5 of 18.18 million deutschmarks per megahertz and 20 million on blocks 6-10. As
one economist explains:
[t]he point . . . is that 18.18 plus a 10% raise equals 19.998 = [approximately] 20. It
seems T-Mobil understood that if it bid 20 million [deutschmarks] on blocks 1-5, but did
not bid again on blocks 6-10, the two companies would then 'live and let live' with nei-
ther company challenging the other on 'the other's' half. Exactly that happened.
Id. One of T-Mobile's managers confirmed, "There were no agreements with Mannesman. But [T-
Mobile interpreted] Mannesman's first bid was a clear offer." Id.
326. Klemperer, supra note 323, at 5 (noting a government seller that took no action against
collusive bidding because the seller was afraid to reduce the number of potential bidders). The U.S.
Department of Justice has expressed concerns about collusive bidding. See Marshall & Meurer,
supra note 317, at 83 (noting the antitrust community's lack of attention to auction collusion).
327. Evans & Dolin, supra note 51.
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a liquid patent holder's ability to use strategies to increase licensing rates
above the market. As illustrated by the comparison of two cases-
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak328 and MercExchange LLC v. eBay
Inc.32 9-there is a distinction between the nature of the harm suffered by
a patentee who commercialized a patented invention and the owner of a
liquid patent.
a. Polaroid v. Kodak: The Nature of A Commercializing Pat-
entee's Harm
Polaroid's patent infringement case against Kodak 330 provides a
useful illustration of a case involving an innovating patent holder. Polar-
oid filed suit against Kodak, who was found to have infringed twenty
claims of seven patents that the court determined incorporated instant
photography as implemented by both parties.331 Polaroid sought dam-
ages on the two available damages theories-lost profits and a reason-
able royalty.
Polaroid's case represents the paradigmatic case for the reward and
prospect policies embodied in the patent laws. Polaroid's technology
was developed by the company's founder, Edwin H. Land,332 who ob-
tained his first patent in the field in 1933. 333 Upon the introduction of
product to the market in 1948, "[i]nstant photography created a sensation
.... "334 At that time, the technology was relatively crude. After taking
a picture, end users had to pull out a positive and negative "sandwich"
packet from the camera.335 The end user then had to separate the sand-
wich by peeling the negative away, to reveal a monotone, sepia-colored
photograph.336
As Kitch's prospect theory might have foretold, Polaroid continued
to innovate in the instant photography field and ultimately developed an
"elegant, highly sophisticated camera and film system" such that "[t]he
photographer needs to do nothing but focus the camera and expose the
film to obtain a finished print. 3 37 Polaroid continued to obtain patent
improvements, some of which were asserted against Kodak in the law-
328. No. 76-1634-MA, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968 (D. Mass. Oct. 12, 1990, corrected Jan.
11, 1991).
329. 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 401
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cit. 2005), rev'don other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
330. Polaroid Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968.
331. ld. at *1.
332. ld. at * 12.
333. Polarizing Refracting Bodies, U.S. Patent No. 1,918,848 (filed Apr. 26, 1929) (issued July
18, 1933).
334. Polaroid Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *12.
335. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828, 830 (D. Mass. 1985) (describing
the earliest versions of the technology).
336. Polaroid Corp., 641 F. Supp. at 830.
337. Id. at 831.
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suit.338 Consistent with the reward incentive, Polaroid enjoyed market
exclusivity from 1948 until Kodak entered the market in 1976.
Beginning in 1969, Kodak began research and development efforts
for an instant photography system for projected entry into the market in
1976.339 Several parallel projects were pursued with at least one project
becoming abandoned after Kodak spent as much as $94 million dollars in
research and development. 340 Kodak purchased large quantities of Polar-
oid's products, and ordered several groups to familiarize themselves with
Polaroid's technology.34' In September 1973, Kodak's Development
Committee stated that Kodak's "development should not be constrained
by what an individual feels is potential patent infringement., 342 Kodak
ultimately entered the market with a series of simple cameras that sold at
a lower price range than Polaroid's more sophisticated versions.343
After Kodak was found to have infringed Polaroid's patents, Polar-
oid asserted that Kodak's entry into the market had forced a price war,
that Polaroid had been forced to change business strategy to prioritize
lower-priced cameras to hold market share against Kodak's inexpensive
products, and that Polaroid was unable to raise prices based on the fear
that the market would tip in Kodak's favor.344 After reviewing substan-
tial evidence submitted by the parties, the court found that Polaroid lost
profits of over $248 million.345 In addition, the court awarded a reason-
able royalty of ten percent of Kodak's sales and prejudgment interest for
a total award of over $870 million.34
Kodak's infringement harmed Polaroid in a number of ways. Po-
laroid's right to exclude under the patent right was being violated by
Kodak. Polaroid had incurred significant research and development
costs for the technology at issue, building on work since the company
had been founded several decades earlier.347 In addition, Polaroid suf-
fered direct market harm by lost sales to Kodak as a competitor. 34 8 Po-
laroid also claimed that its "historical business practices, and the sensible
business direction it would have taken, was altered and diverted because
it had to respond to Kodak's entry into the instant photography mar-
338. See id. at 830 (describing the patents at issue).
339. Id. at 831.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 832.
342. Id.
343. Polaroid Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *17.
344. See id. at *28-30.
345. Id. at *208.
346. Id. at *220, 246; see also Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76-1364-MA, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 344, at *12 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1991) (noting the corrected final judgment amount).
347. See Polaroid Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *183.
348. See id at *20-2 1.
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ket., 349 Polaroid further argued that Kodak had waged a price war that in
turn forced Polaroid to reduce prices for its products.35°
b. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.:351 The Nature of a
Liquid Patent Holder's Harm
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. provides an opportunity to ex-
amine the damage positions of a liquid patent holder. MercExchange
technology concerned particular methods for purchasing on the inter-
net.352 The patent was developed by MercExchange's founder, Thomas
Woolston, an electrical engineer and patent attorney.353 Woolston filed
his first patent application in April 1995, which was the parent of the
patent asserted against eBay in the lawsuit. 354  Woolston invented his
system to use in a business that would practice his invention. 355
MercExchange developed a business plan, sought capital and hired em-
ployees to put the patents into practice.356 In addition, MercExchange
sought to license the patents,357 including through discussions with
eBay.358 In 2000, it became clear to MercExchange that it lacked the
capital to commercialize its inventions. 9
MercExchange filed suit against eBay, a successful Internet com-
pany, and two other entities alleged to be using MercExchange's tech-
nology.360 At trial, these defendants were held to have willfully infringed
MercExchange's patent.36' Despite the Schumpeterian view that "[a]s
long as they are not carried into practice, inventions are economically
irrelevant, 3 62 the trial court entered judgment for $29.5 million in favor
of MercExchange.363 The amount awarded by the jury was three times
higher than the figure proposed by MercExchange's expert.3 4
349. Id. at *29.
350. Id.
351. 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 401 F.3d 1323,
1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev 'don other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 733 (2006).
352. Brief for Respondent at 2, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)
(No. 05-130).
353. Id. at 1.
354. Id.




359. Id. at 4.
360. Id. at 4, 29.
361. Id. at 6. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated a permanent injunction against eBay and re-
manded the case, directing the trial court to consider equitable principles in determining whether
such relief was appropriate in the case. eBaylnc., 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
362. See Julie S. Turner, The Nonmanufacturing Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient
Infringement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 179, 188 (1998) (quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 88-89 (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1951)).
363. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 722.
364. Id. at 709.
250 [Vol. 84:1
LIQUID PA TENTS
The difference between the economic harm that Polaroid suffered
compared to the type of harm suffered by MercExchange lies in the criti-
cal details of each plaintiffs position. Unlike Polaroid, MercExchange
did not lose sales because MercExchange did not sell any product or pro-
vide any selling service relating to the patent. Rather, MercExchange's
sole use of the patent was to license the patent to infringers.365  The
argument that lost profits should be recoverable because the infringer
effectively prevented the patentee's ability to enter the market was not at
issue in the MercExchange case. Likewise, MercExchange did not argue
that eBay's infringement prevented MercExchange's ability to obtain the
financing necessary for MercExchange to commercialize. Rather than
pursuing such theories, MercExchange sought a reasonable royalty and
damages for willful infringement.366 MercExchange also took the posi-
tion that eBay's infringement made licensing to others more difficult.
367
In short, the type of harm that MercExchange suffered was different
in kind that that suffered by Polaroid. Although both MercExchange and
Polaroid developed technology, unlike Polaroid MercExchange was not
harmed by the infringement with respect to costs relating to the creation
of a market, lost sales to a competitor or by losing the costs to develop
and commercialize a product. MercExchange did not suffer competitive
harm.
There are a number of sound reasons why patentees do not com-
mercialize their inventions.368 As with the patentee in the MercExchange
case, the inventor may lack sufficient financial resources to bring the
patented idea to the market. The patent may be targeted to a market that
has not sufficiently developed to support manufacture and sale. There
may be implementation problems for the commercial application of the
idea. A patent holder may determine that licensing the patent is more
profitable or poses fewer risks than commercialization. Under patent
law, there is no question that compensation for non-commercialized pat-
ents is available.369
However, the case law has not clearly defined the analysis to suffi-
ciently compensate harm from infringement of liquid patents. As a lost
365. Brief for Respondent, supra note 352, at 4.
366. See MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 718.
367. Brief for Respondent, supra note 352, at 4.
368. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 1, 75-76 (2001). This article cites the following: (1) the invention is not commercially viable,
due to circumstances such as lack of demand, cost, lack of financing, inability to develop a market-
able embodiment, or underestimation of its commercial value; (2) the technology is commercially
viable but less promising than other technologies the patent owner is investigating; (3) the technol-
ogy lacks commercial applications within the area of the patent owner's expertise; (4) the patent
owner has been unable to find a willing licensee to commercialize the patent; and (5) the patent
owner resists commercialization, because the new invention would compete against some other
product the patent owner currently markets. Id.
369. King Instruments, 65 F.3d at 949.
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profits analysis is unlikely to apply to an entity that is solely devoted to
licensing, the relevant standard for damages for infringement of a liquid
patent is reasonable royalty.370 Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit agree that patentee compensation is the fundamental pur-
pose of patent damages.371 In short, "while the statutory text states
tersely that the patentee receive 'adequate' damages, the Supreme Court
has interpreted this to mean that 'adequate' damages should approximate
those damages that will fully compensate the patentee for infringe-
ment." 372 However, there is no test which assists the lower courts in de-
termining how much a violation of the patent right-in the abstract and
without any related market harm-is worth. Further, and somewhat cu-
riously, no Georgia Pacific factor asks the fact finder to consider the
type or extent of the patentee's harm although this is the fundamental
statutory purpose of section 284. 7
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have recog-
nized that damages must have a causative relation to the harm suffered
by the patentee to the damages awarded.374 Yet the Georgia Pacific fac-
tors, which represent the fundament test for reasonable royalty damages,
do not contain any causative requirement.
Where both parties are competitors that innovate and sell products,
the absence of considerations, such as the nature of the patentee's harm
from the Georgia Pacific factors creates little difficulty. Just as Polar-
oid's right to exclude was accompanied by actual harm to Polaroid's
efforts to commercialize instant photography, many patentees suffer
harm to business in a measurable, tangible way when encountering in-
fringing competitors even though such harm is not compensable as lost
profits under section 284.
At present, the reasonable royalty test does not include a concrete
framework for differentiating between the types of harms suffered by
liquid patent holders from those patentees who have undertaken the ex-
pense and risk of innovation and commercialization. A jury is given no
criteria to measure harm that flows from the violation of the right to ex-
clude in isolation. Yet it is precisely this violation that is at stake when a
liquid patent is asserted in litigation. Creating a method to quantify such
370. See supra text accompanying note 299.
371. See, e.g., Devex, 461 U.S. at 653-54; Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544-45.
372. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545.
373. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 2006).
374. Aro Mfg. Co., 377 U.S. at 507 (The question to be asked in determining damages is "how
much had the Patent Holder and Licensee suffered by the infringement. And that question [is]
primarily: had the Infringer not infringed, what would the Patentee Holder-Licensee have made?")
(quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Industries, Inc., 251 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1958); see
also Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545.
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harm would permit more accuracy in jury awards, and would also pro-
vide parameters for licensing discussions with liquid patent holders.375
4. Proposal for Modifications: Addressing Monetary Damage
Awards for Infringement of Liquid Patents
Proposals to change the patent system to accommodate the practices
of liquid patent holders fit within the contours of existing law for patent
damages. The damages calculation, which is directed to compensate
harm to the patentee, should specifically consider the patent owner's use
and exploitation of the patent. The following proposals are therefore
appropriate for the damages calculation for a liquid patent.
a. Fact finders should expressly consider the nature of the
harm to the patentee.
The patent holder should outline the nature of the harm that is suf-
fered, consistent with the acknowledged statutory purpose of 35 U.S.C.
section 284. Currently, both innovating patentees and liquid patent hold-
ers may seek reasonable royalty recovery under the general rubric of the
Georgia Pacific test. 37 6 However, the nature of the harm suffered by
each may be quite different in kind, as one who undertakes the risk and
expense of innovation is likely to suffer different harm than one who
purchases a patent. The Georgia Pacific test should be modified to ex-
pressly require patentees to identify the nature of the harm that has been
suffered.
Additionally, the patentee should identify the causative relation be-
tween the amount sought to recover for infringement and the harm suf-
fered by the patentee. Thus, those patentees who have been precluded
from entering the market by an infringer are likely justified in seeking a
higher royalty award than those who have made an independent decision
to refrain from commercialization independent of any conduct of the
infringer.
This proposal should not suppress royalty awards, as one would ex-
pect the owner of a very valuable liquid patent to obtain a substantial
royalty award based on the infringer's use. If the patentee's harm is
based on the infringer's failure to take a license, the standard is intended
to focus the fact finder's attention on the effect of that conduct on the
patentee.
375. Cf Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 276, at 950-51 (arguing that parties reach agree-
ments in private ordering based of considerations on the alternatives that adjudication would likely
award).
376. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1116.
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b. If the harm to the right to exclude a liquid patent is in-
fringer's failure to take a license, the parties should proffer
a proposed royalty rate that does not depend on the avail-
ability of a mandatory injunction against future infringe-
ment.
Until eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.377 was decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2006, the Federal Circuit applied a "general rule that
courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement ab-
sent exceptional circumstances." 378  As a practical matter, permanent
injunctions were routinely granted in the district courts after a finding of
patent infringement.379
Historical license rates have been skewed upward by the practice
that patent holders have been able to threaten to shut down production
with these nearly automatic injunctions that would prevent their licensee
targets from selling any future products. 380  The widespread and certain
availability of a permanent injunction in patent cases permitted patent
holders to hold out and negotiate royalty rates that exceed the value of
the patented invention.8 Under those circumstances, patent owners
were overcompensated for the inventions, particularly in those cases
where the invention covered only a portion of the accused device or
process.
382
Negotiated royalties established under the threat of the entry of an
automatic permanent injunction have been subject to the hold out effect.
At the same time, the reasonable royalty damages calculation favors a
rate based on historical licensing rates to the extent that such rates ex-
ist.383 To the extent that a patentee has had the benefit of licensing nego-
tiation leverage based on the ready availability of injunctive relief, the
established royalty should be discounted to reflect the patentee's harm.
377. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
378. Id. at 1839 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
379. See Brief Amici Curiae of 52 Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners at
2, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130) (noting the trend toward
the automatic entry of an injunction in patent cases).
380. eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (noting that for licensing entities, "an injunction, and the
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to
charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent") (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
381. Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold Ups and Patent Royalties, Aug. 2006,
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/royalties.pdf ("Royalty over-charges are greatest for weak
patents covering patented features that offer minor contributions to complex products sold at prices
well above margin cost.").
382. Id. at 1 ("The principal finding in this paper is that the current U.S. patent system system-
atically overrewards the owners of weak patents, especially in the information technology sector
where a single product can incorporate many patented features.").
383. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1554 ("The royalty may be based upon an established royalty, if




The patent holder's ability to hold out based on the threat of an perma-
nent injunction under the former law should not supersede the fundamen-
tal purpose of the damages statute, which is to provide the patentee with
compensation for harm.
c. The amount paid for the patent by the patent holder should
not be determinative of the royalty rate for infringement in
the litigation.
As detailed above,384 the amounts paid by a patentee have limited
assistance in determining the current value of a patent or in setting the
measure of a patentee's harm. The circumstances and dynamics of the
acquisition should be examined to determine whether the patent holder
paid a price that is informative of the patent's fair market value.
Further, 35 U.S.C. section 284 dictates that damages be awarded
"adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer..."
This statutory language puts a clear focus on an examination of the pat-
ent as implemented in the infringing product. Thus, a patentee's recov-
ery is in the nature of a non-exclusive license for a particular use for a
specific time frame. The price paid to obtain the patent has limited use-
fulness for that purpose.
d. The award to the patentee should not award the risks of in-
novation to the liquid patent holder.
Unless there is a causal relation between the infringement and the
patentee's determination to license rather than to commercialize the pat-
ent, the fact finder should not award innovation costs to the patentee.
The Georgia Pacific test asks the jury to consider as the thirteenth factor
"[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the inven-
tion as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing
process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by
the infringer." 385 However, this factor is stated too narrowly to allow
attribution of all innovative activity to the infringer. For example, the
popularity of a product that is due to the infringer's advertising, devel-
opment of a market, superior consumer support, the infringer's name or
development of marketing and distribution channels are not valid com-
ponents of the patentee's harm.
Even if this issue were resolved, however, difficulties remain. A
jury should be presented with relevant, scientifically valid evidence that
permits consideration of the relevant contribution of both parties to the
infringing product. The jury would then calculate a royalty that consid-
ers the efforts of both parties to product sales. Such a procedure would
384. See supra Part V.B.2.
385. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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attempt to isolate the value of the invention as used in the infringing
product. To the extent that courts wish to include some damages to ac-
complish deterrence by increasing the damage award, that measure could
then be added. Because courts have failed to apply damages policies and
evidentiary standards meaningfully, royalties awarded in patent cases fail
to be accurate measures of a patentee's harm.386
Moreover, the trend over the past several years has been to award
more of the infringer's innovative activity to the patentee and not less. In
part, this has been because the court has expanded the "entire market
value" rule.387 The entire market value rule is applied where both pat-
ented and unpatented components are sold together.388 Essentially, the
entire market value rule expands the royalty base to permit the patentee
to recover for unpatented components, in recognition that "the economic
value of a patent may be greater than the value of the sales of the pat-
ented part alone., 389 Formerly, royalty awards were increased by ex-
panding the royalty base if the patented components were of "substantial
importance" the sale a multi-invention product.390  For example, the
Federal Circuit permits expansion of the royalty base where the unpat-
ented components are foreseeably sold with the patented components. 391
This broad forseeability standard permits a jury to award damages for
unpatented component to the patentee so long as all components are sold
together. Indeed, recently the Federal Circuit has upheld a royalty award
that was based on sales of products to the parent company of the patent
holder.392 In that case, the parent company commercialized the product,
but the patent holder did not.393 The entire market value rule as recently
applied awards more of the value of infringer innovation and commer-
cialization to the patentee.
For liquid patent holders who have made a conscious decision not to
engage in any product development, marketing or sales, expanded
awards are not adequate reflections of the patentee's harm. Permitting
liquid patent holders to recover the full benefit of the defendant's innova-
tive activity does not serve the purpose of compensating patentees for the
harm suffered, which for liquid patent holders amounts to a lost opportu-
nity to grant a non-exclusive license to the infringer. Patentees operating
under the current standards may determine that undertaking the risk of
386. Landers, supra note 308, at 334-35.
387. See King Instruments, 65 F.3d at 951 n.4.
388. See id.
389. See id.; see also Site Microsurgical Sys., Inc. v. Cooper Cos., 797 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.
Del. 1992) ("The rule merely recognizes the actual economic value of the patented technology.").
390. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 962, 973-974 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
391. Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (although the
patent claims covered only a device for fusing materials, the court awarded damages on the fused
materials themselves, as a foreseeable harm from the infringement).
392. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
393. Union Carbide Chem., 425 F.3d at 1377.
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commercialization is irrational, as the monetary rewards of selling prod-
uct will flow to them by succeeding against an infringer who has already
done so. Thus, a more balanced approach that prevents patentees to re-
cover more than their harm will better serve the commercialization pur-
pose that the patent laws are intended to promote.
Fundamentally, the patent right provides patentees with the right to
exclude and is intended to foster the encouragement of investment-based
risk.394 The patent right provides no assurance of market acceptance, that
manufacture will be feasible and cost effective nor that a more desirable
means to solve the same problem will not compete with the patented
invention. The concepts embodied by the term "investment-based risk"
stand on uncertainty, and the risks of approaching the marketplace with a
patented invention may be significant. 395 A liquid patent holder is not
entitled to obtain the benefits of the risks that the patentee did not under-
take.
VI. LIQUID IP: PATENTS AND MONOPOLIES
Liquid patent holders have the potential to purchase some measure
of power through acquisition of patent rights. The purchase of even a
single key patent can prevent an entire industry from engaging in re-
search, development and sales in a particular field. The liquid patent
holder may be demanding fees based on a patent of questionable validity.
License rates demanded by liquid patent holders may be far above the
patent's value. Although the parties can litigate the merits in court, the
mere fact that a patent lawsuit is pending can harm an alleged infringer's
sales 396 even if the lawsuit is ultimately dismissed or the patent is adjudi-
cated as invalid.
Generally, a patentee's activity in asserting and licensing is insu-
lated from such forms of liability as antitrust law, even where the patent
holder's conduct is injurious. This protection is policy based, grounded
in an assumption that subjecting a patentee to antitrust scrutiny would
"severely trample upon the incentives provided by our patent laws and
thus undermine the entire patent system. 3 97 However, this policy-based
rationale lacks support for liquid patent holders. In many cases, the in-
394. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
395. The phrase "investment-based risk" stands on much more uncertain ground than the
phrase "investment backed expectation" that is used to define a compensable property right under
takings law. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
396. See, e.g., Andrew R. Hickey, Experts: Don't Deploy BlackBerry, MOBILE COMPUTING
NEWS, December 9, 2005, http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/originalContent/
0,289142,sid40_gcil151223,00.html (reporting warnings to potential customers not to invest in
accused wireless messaging device, despite the fact that an appeal was pending and a request to
invalidate the patent in suit was pending before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
397. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1209 (2d Cir. 1981); Miller Insituform, Inc.
v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding "[t]here is no adverse effect
on competition since, as a patent monopolist, [the patentee], from the start, had exclusive right to
manufacture, use, and sell his invention").
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ventor and innovator have sold the patent to a liquid patent holder, who
is engaging in conduct similar to any other business. To such entities,
patents operate as an asset and not as a vehicle for invention.
A. Antitrust Protection for Exploitation of the Patent Right
As background, there is an inherent tension between the patent
law's right of exclusivity and the antitrust law's disfavor of economic
monopolies.398 Antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition.399
Although not all patents confer monopoly power in the antitrust sense,400
a patent or the product based on a patented invention may develop into
dominance in an industry. Fundamentally, a patent grants a patentee the
right to exclude others entirely from profiting from the patented inven-
tion in one or several markets.40 1 In such cases, a patentee's exercise of
the right to exclude-whether by refusing to license or asserting the pat-
ent against an infringer-may prevent the type of competition that the
antitrust laws were enacted to protect.
Yet a patentee's conduct in exploiting the patent right is typically
insulated from antitrust scrutiny. The patent right includes the right to
suppress the invention while continuing to prevent all others from using
it, to refuse to license others and, if a patentee decides to license, to
charge the highest royalty that the market permits during the patent
term.40 2 Although such actions may have anticompetitive effects, the
government grant of exclusivity embodied in a patent in most cases
shields patent holders against antitrust liability for exercising the patent
right because such anticompetitive effects are considered "part and par-
cel of the patent system's role in creating incentives for potential inven-
tors. ''4 3 Thus, courts have drawn a distinction4°4 between the economic
monopoly prevented by the antitrust laws and patent assertion because a
patentee is "the owner of a monopoly recognized by the Constitution and
by the statutes of Congress. 4 5
398. United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recog-
nizing "the fundamental fact that a patent by definition restrains trade, and in effect makes most
exclusive patent licenses per se violations of the antitrust laws").
399. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 115 (1986).
400. See, e.g., I1l. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1292 (2006) (finding
that products that are patented are not entitled to a presumption of market power on the patentee);
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 13 1, at 374.
401. Kohle, 670 F.2d at 1127.
402. Id.
403. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
404. Some scholars have observed that this distinction is not considerable, as the antitrust laws
"are generally hostile to" claims of refusing to deal, even where no intellectual property rights are at
stake. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Unilateral Refusals to License, 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 5 (2006) ("The Supreme Court's repeated invocation of the rule that the
antitrust laws 'protection of competition, not competitors' seems applicable here." (citing Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (footnote omitted)).
405. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70,88 (1902).
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The Federal Circuit has promulgated a general rule that "the con-
duct at issue is illegal if it threatens competition in areas other than those
protected by the patent, and is otherwise legal. ' 4°6 For example, in U.S.
v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, the court rejected the United States' argu-
ment that the patentee's refusal to license created such anticompetitive
harms as excluding potential sellers from the market, selling products
made with the patented process in excess of competitive levels, and re-
straining trade in related technology were insufficient to establish an
antitrust violation.4 °7 The court found that "[n]one of these restraints go
beyond what the patent itself authorizes," and that the "exclusion of
competitors, and charging of supracompetitive prices are at the core of
the patentee's rights, and are legitimate rewards of the patent monop-
According to the Federal Circuit, conduct that excludes competitors
from competing in a market that may raise concerns under antitrust law
will typically present no legal liability where that conduct is a legitimate
exercise of a patent right.40 9 Further, in the Federal Circuit, a competi-
tor's subjective motivation to exclude a competitor is irrelevant if those
circumstances are met.4 1°
The protection against antitrust penalty provided to patent owners is
founded on the policy of preserving patent law's incentives. The Federal
Circuit has explained that certain protections against antitrust suits based
on a patentee's conduct are necessary to preserve intellectual property's
incentive system.41' As one scholar elaborates, the public benefit gained
from innovation justifies permitting intellectual property holders to en-
gage in conduct necessary to enforce their rights without antitrust scru-
tiny:
Even the introduction of a product subject to monopoly power can
represent a gain to society. That is the underlying logic of our patent
system, in which the monopoly profit expected from innovation cre-
406. Kohle, 670 F.2d at 1128.
407. Id. at 1125-26.
408. Id. at 1128.
409. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Robert
Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 921-23 (2001).
410. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see
Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual Property: Why
Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between 1P and Other Property Rights, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 741,744 (2004) (noting that the case "establishes a rule of per se legality" for the exercise of the
exclusionary rights under copyright and patent law). But see Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1212 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting patent owner's intellectual property justifi-
cation for alleged exclusionary conduct could be rebutted by a showing that the justification was
pretextual).
411. Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 1343-44; see In Re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at
1327-29; Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068-69 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 876-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds
by Nobelpharma AB, 141 F.3d at 1059.
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ates an incentive to provide the gain to society. It has been estimated
that the social return to invention significantly exceeds the private re-
turn. That means that antitrust should be especially wary when its
action reduces the return to innovators of intellectual property be-
cause we know that there already is too little incentive to create such
intellectual property.
412
Some criticize the Federal Circuit's rulings as going too far by "ex-
alt[ing] protection of intellectual property rights" to the detriment of anti-
trust enforcement.41 3  Typical of this view, one commentator notes,
"[t]oday it is quite clear that an antitrust claim at the Federal Circuit will
fail.
, 4 14
B. Antitrust Limitations on Anticompetitive Patentee Conduct
There are exceptions to the doctrine that the exercise of a patent
right is protected against antitrust liability. For example, a patent holder
who procured the patent through "knowing and willful fraud" is not im-
mune from antitrust liability.415 Further, a patent holder is not shielded by
antitrust liability if the patent owner asserts an objectively baseless suit
that is subjectively motivated by a desire to impose collateral, anti-
competitive injury rather than to obtain a justifiable legal remedy.4 16
Conduct that reaches outside the patent may be actionable, for example
where patent holders have pooled their patents and fix prices on the
products for themselves and their licensees, 4 17 tying,418 use the patent to
or restrict sales of unpatented products4 19 or to seek royalties beyond the
expiration of the patent term.420 However, liquid patent holders can ex-
ercise a significant amount of market power without violating any of
these exceptions.
There are antitrust principles which consider the problem that pur-
chasing patents creates the possibility that monopoly power can be ac-
412. Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal To Deal-
Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 673-74 (2001) (footnote omitted)
(citing Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q.J.
ECONOMICS 1119 (1998)).
413. Pitofsky, supra note 409 at 921-22. ("[Q]uestions arise as to what the Federal Circuit's
approach portends-i.e., an approach that seems to exalt protection of intellectual property rights-
with respect to continuing validity in the Federal Circuit of the long-standing balance between anti-
trust and intellectual property."); J. Robert Robertson, FTC Part III Litigation: Lessons from Chi-
cago Bridge and Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, 20 ANTITRUST 12, 13 (Spring 2006) (noting
that the federal circuit "is not known to be pro-enforcement in the antitrust area").
414. Thomas, supra note 12 1, at 794.
415. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1326.
416. Id.
417. United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 380 (1952).
418. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
419. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136-37 (1969).
420. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964).
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cumulated. 421 The antitrust laws create liability for the accumulation of
422market power through patent acquisition. In particular, section 7 of
the Clayton Act 423 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act 424 provide arguable
grounds to address such conduct.425 Over the past several years, how-
ever, private parties have had an increasingly difficult time bringing such
claims.
Although the U.S. Department of Justice has brought some en-
forcement actions under the antitrust laws for the accumulation of market
power in patents during a corporate merger, 426 and historically such re-
lief was available to private parties, courts have become more reluctant
to permit private litigants to succeed.
For example, in the 1952 case of Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump
Co., 427 the court examined the conduct of patent holder Kobe, who had
obtained seventy-two patents from a predecessor and entered into a
closed pooling arrangement with another company to dominate the mar-
ket for oil drills. 428 Kobe asserted five of these patents against defendant
Demsey, a new entrant competitor who was held to have infringed one of
the patents that had been held valid.429 In assessing Demsey's counter-
claim under the Sherman Act, the court found that "Kobe did not insti-
tute the infringement action in bad faith," but nonetheless found that
Kobe had violated antitrust laws. 430 The Kobe court explained that "al-
though Kobe believed that some of its patents were infringed, the real
purpose of the infringement action and the incidental activities of Kobe's
representatives w[ere] to further the existing monopoly and to eliminate
Dempsey as a competitor.
'A31
More recently, courts have been reluctant to grant relief for non-
government plaintiffs. Examples include both Axis, S.p.A. v. Micafil,
432
421. See Kitch, supra note 91, at 1740 (noting that "agreements which concentrate a number of
single rights under common control have the obvious potential to create monopoly power").
422. Id.
423. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 2006).
424. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2.
425. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18; see also Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.
1952); SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1205; Yee Wah Chin, Unilateral Technology Suppression. Appro-
priate Antitrust and Patent Law Remedies, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 441,446 (1998).
426. See e.g., United States v. 3D Sys. Corp., No. CIV. I:01CV01237(GK) (D.D.C. Sept. 4,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9OOO/9019.pdf; United States v. Miller Inds.,
No. CIV 1:00CV00305 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2000), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f4100/4188.pdf; In the Matter of CIBA-Geigy Ltd., CIBA-Geigy
Corp., Chiron Corp., Sandoz Ltd., Sandoz Corp., and Novartis AG, Docket No. C-3725, File No.
961 0055, at 1, 19-20 (F.T.C Apr. 8, 1997) (complaint, decisions, and orders available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/c3725.htm).
427. Dempsey Pump, 198 F.2d at 419-21.
428. Id. at 420-21.
429. Id. at 418.
430. Id. at 424.
431. Id. at 425.
432. 870 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1989).
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and SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,433 both of which challenged the pat-
entee's acquiring certain patents as a violation of the antitrust laws. In
Axis, S.p.A. v. Micafil, antitrust plaintiff Axis asserted a violation of sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act against defendant Micafil, who had a acquired a
company along with a number of patents on the only two methods of
cutting wire for components used in small appliances.434 Axis alleged
that Micafil's acquisition of those patents were "the only things prevent-
ing Axis' entry into the market. ' ,43' Axis further alleged that had suf-
fered an antitrust injury-that is, an injury that reflects a causal connec-
tion to the anticompetitive act that is the subject of the antitrust viola-
tion.436 An antitrust injury is a necessary although not always sufficient
requirement to demonstrate certain antitrust claims.437
The Axis court accepted that the acquisition violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act, and that "the patents presented an impenetrable barrier to
the plaintiffs entry" to the market.438 Rejecting Axis' damages claim for
lost sales and lost profits, the court found that Axis could not establish an
antitrust injury.439 Specifically, the court reasoned that the patents pre-
sented as much a barrier before the merger as afterwards, and therefore
Axis would have suffered the injury regardless of the antitrust viola-
tion.44 ° On this basis, the Axis court affirmed dismissal of the antitrust
claims.441
The Axis case appears to create an impenetrable bar to antitrust suits
brought by infringers where an antitrust injury is an essential element.
An infringer can never establish antitrust injury from the acquisition of
an existing patent, since a patent is always owned by someone and so the
potential for enforcement exists regardless of the owner's identity.
442
The antitrust injury requirement for section 7 of the Clayton Act strictly
thus limits the ability to enforce that provision.
Additionally, in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., the Second Circuit has
held that liability under Section 7 of the Clayton Act for the acquisition
of a patent with monopoly power cannot occur where the patent has not
been commercialized at the time of the acquisition. In SCM Corp.,
Xerox had acquired patents relating to copying that did not require using
433. 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
434. Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1105-06.
435. Id. at 1106 (quoted source contains an alteration to the original).
436. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111-12; Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1107.
437. See id.; Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1105-07.
438. Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1107.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at llll.
442. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (denying antitrust claim for lack of antitrust injury finding that "[tihe cause of [the infringer's]
injuries was not that [the patentee] enforced the... patent, but that the patent was enforced at all"),
abrogated on other grounds by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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any wet chemistry. 443 After entering into a series of license agreements
for the patents, Xerox purchased various patents for the technology be-
tween 1956 and 1959. 444 However, Xerox did not commercially sell a
plain paper copier until 1960.445 Plaintiff SCM Corp. sued Xerox, alleg-
ing that Xerox's acquisition of the patents violated Section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act in the market for plain and coated paper copiers in the office
copier market." 6 The Second Circuit held that SCM Corp. could not es-
tablish this claim, because Xerox did not begin selling products into the
market until one year after the last patent had been acquired." 7
As with cases examining protections for a patentee to assert or re-
fuse to license a patent, both the Axis and SCM Corp. courts rely on pat-
ent policy of encouraging incentives to invent as bases for their deci-
sions.448 Acknowledging that "the acquisition of a patent can create the
potential for tremendous market power," 449 the SCM Corp. court invoked
the image of the inventor who bestows the benefit of genius on the pub-
lic: "That the first patent laws were enacted at the second session of our
first Congress manifests the importance our founding fathers attached to
encouraging inventive genius, a resource that proved to be bountiful
throughout this nation's history., 450 Further, SCM Corp. acknowledged
that the patent law's reward "with the power to exclude others from ex-
ploiting his invention" is balanced with "the public benefits from the
disclosure of inventions, the entrance into the market of valuable prod-
ucts whose invention might have been delayed but for the incentives
provided by the patent laws, and the increased competition the patented
product creates in the marketplace." 4"5  Significantly, the SCM court
found that these policies and protections apply to those who invest-and
not only those who invent-within the patent system. 52
More generally and because of these policy justifications, antitrust
law provides leeway to liquid patent holders to acquire and assert pat-
ents, in some instances even where the patent has monopoly power. Par-
ticularly for cases adjudicated in the Federal Circuit where antitrust
443. Id. at 1199; see THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF XEROGRAPHY 4 (1983) (print on file with author), available at http://files.asme.org/
ASMEORG/Communities/History/Landmarks/5663.pdf.
444. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1199-1200.
445. Id. at 1200.
446. Id. at 1199 n.1.
447. Id. at 1207, 1211 (inferring that the court left open the possibility that an acquisition made
into a reasonably foreseeable economic market might violate section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act).
448. Axis, S.p.A., 870 F.2d at 1111 (noting "[o]ur patent and antitrust laws seek to further
different and opposing policies. Patent laws grant a monopoly for a limited time in order "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... " Further, "a lawfully acquired patent creates a
monopoly that does not violate the antitrust laws."); SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1203-05.
449. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1205.
450. Id. at 1203.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1206 n.9.
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claims have been most difficult to bring, a liquid patent holder with a
colorable assertion of infringement can assert the patent so long as ex-
ceptions to antitrust immunity are not present. If the liquid patent holder
performs adequate due diligence to ensure against fraud, tying and frivo-
lous claims, many of these exceptions can be eliminated as a legal or
factual possibility.453 Assuming that the liquid patent holder does not
itself possess monopoly power, those who seek to obtain patents in un-
derdeveloped commercial markets may be able to avoid scrutiny for ac-
quisitions of patents by a private actor who infringes, particularly under
Xerox in a market that has not yet been commercialized.454 The courts
have therefore left liquid patent holders with considerable room to ac-
quire and use patents in a manner which might cause harm to the market
or to consumers.
C. Liquid Patent Holders and Antitrust Law
The deference that antitrust law provides to liquid patents is not
supported by the incentive policy justification. Patent purchasers who
seek to profit from another's inventive activity lack any connection with
those who require an incentive to invent. Unlike those who fund inven-
tion or patent prosecution, those who seek to profit by purchasing patents
to assert against those engaged in commercial activity appear too late in
the process to have contributed to the incentive to invent or disclose pat-
ented inventions.
The societal benefits of the assertion of liquid patents are not sub-
stantially supported by the traditional patent law policies. As evidenced
by the need to enact section 7 of the Clayton Act, the acquisition of con-
centrated power may cause harm by foreclosing consumer choice
through acquisition.455 Even where industry is content with the state of
competition, the broader public interest may be harmed by the elimina-
tion of those engaged in commercial activity.456 The patent laws do not
453. Pitofsky, supra note 409, at 921 (explaining, for example, the fraud exception is not
exceptionally difficult to avoid, having been described as "more difficult to prove than almost any
antitrust allegation" because the patent applicant must be shown to have "made knowing and willful
misrepresentations that resulted in a patent that would not have issued in the absence of a misrepre-
sentation.") (citing Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070-71).
454. However, governmental inquiry into an already existing or reasonably foreseeable market
may lead to liability into a patent acquirer's conduct.
455. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 (1963) ("A fundamental purpose of
amending [section 7 of the Clayton Act] was to arrest the trend toward concentration [and] the
tendency to monopoly, before the consumer's alternatives disappeared ... " (punctuation deleted)).
456. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588 (D.C.N.Y. 1958)
(noting the types of harm that were sought to be remedied by enacting section 7 of the Clayton Act
include:
(1) elimination in whole or in material part of the competitive activity of an enterprise
which has been a substantial factor in competition, (2) increase in the relative size of the
enterprise making the acquisition to such a point that its advantage over its competitors
threatens to be decisive, (3) undue reduction in the number of competing enterprises, or
(4) establishment of relationships between buyers and sellers which deprive their rivals of
a fair opportunity to compete.
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themselves allow consumers court access to challenge any patent-related
anticompetitive conduct even when such patents are invalid.457 Like-
wise, the patent laws provide no relief for those against whom the patent
is asserted. Any redress must be through other causes of action, such as
the antitrust laws.
Antitrust protections for patentee conduct are concurrent with the
scope of the claim language-that is, limited to the scope of the govern-
ment-granted monopoly-look opaquely at the incentive rewards in the
broadest sense. The decisions do not address the more complex and nu-
anced policy issues raised by liquid patent holders' methods of exploiting
patents that provide-and indeed may interfere-with the patent sys-
tem's purpose of serving innovation. For example, the SCM Corp. court
notes that antitrust protection is appropriate for more than the inventor,
explaining that:
Investors . . . play a key role, if not an indispensable one today, in
both the inventive process and commercialization of inventions. And
it is fair to say, we think, that the contribution of the investor in both
the funding of research that leads to inventions and the promotion
that necessarily must follow to achieve successful commercialization
is of comparable value.
458
The SCM Corp. court's justifications do not extend to liquid patent
holders who do not fund research or assist in commercialization. The
public benefit that is presumed to flow from the activity of an investor
who funds research or bringing products to market is simply absent for
many liquid patent holders. The SCM Corp. court's policy justification
is illustrative of the larger problem. That is, the courts have articulated a
policy basis that protects all patent holders but falls short for a liquid
patent holder that engages in conduct that may harm a market as the pub-
lic benefits that are presumed to flow from the operation of the patent
system are substantially minimized.
Fundamentally, those who hold patents have the power and ability
to foreclose consumer choice and forestall competition. Because the
justifications for such conduct is lacking, there is little reason to continue
to shield liquid patent holders as under the current law. Specifically,
some consideration should be provided for the fact that liquid patent
holders are engaged in profit-making enterprises that are no different
from those in other industries. The continued deference that antitrust law
provides to liquid patent holders may, in the end, tolerate conduct that
harms both markets and innovation.
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 8)).
457. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 541 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
458. SCM Corp., 645 F.2d at 1206 n.9.
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CONCLUSION
The patent system's preference for the uniform administration of the
patent laws has created an opportunity for liquid patent holders to create
markets for patents as commodities. Currently, liquid patent holders
work within the patent laws to create the right. Although at odds with
the policies that support the patent system, liquid patents are likely to
stay so long as their practice remains profitable and the long-established
drive for a uniform patent system remains.
Creating modifications to patentability and enforcement laws based
on use and ownership of the patent right may introduce a troubling and
counterproductive uncertainty into the patent system. Much of the po-
tential harm caused by liquid patent holders is financial in nature-that
is, a liquid patent holder who is able to demand more than a patent is
worth has the potential to harm subsequent innovators who are seeking to
commercially exploit ideas. Some of this is due to the fact that liquid
patent holders are able to extract above market prices due to the threat of
an injunction. Although the eBay case opened the door to the possibility
that such threats may be diminished, modification to the damages provi-
sions should be adopted to prevent abuses of the system. As the law
currently accommodates consideration of patent use and ownership into
its remedies provisions, modifications to those portions of the patent law
may best serve the overall goal of innovation. Further, the protections
against abuse that are currently built into laws, such as the antitrust law,
should be re-examined in light of the liquid patent holder's failure to
support the policy goals of the patent system.
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